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ABSTRACT 
In 2009, the Office of the Secretary of Defense directed the creation of 10 National Guard 
Homeland Response Force (HRF) units to provide regional chemical biological 
radiological nuclear and explosive (CBRNE) and disaster response in each of the 10 
FEMA regions beginning in September 2011. The HRF was selected to fill a regional 
CBRNE capability gap. The HRF concept is a 566-person National Guard unit tasked to 
provide command, CBRNE assessment, decontamination, casualty care, logistics, 
security, and rescue in support of civilian officials during a regional-level CBRNE event 
or disaster.  With domestic response mission and overseas deployment requirements, the 
HRF faces the difficult challenge of meeting both civilian response and military 
battlefield standards. Although some DoD organizations have had similar domestic 
response missions, no precedent for the HRF exists.  The HRF reflects an evolution of 
military units with CBRNE and disaster related missions beginning in the 1990s.  
Government and private criticisms of these previous DoD CBRNE include wasted tax 
dollars, poor training strategies, and poor links to National Planning Scenarios.  This 
thesis provides lessons learned from case studies of previous U.S. and Israeli CBRNE 
and disaster response organizations while recommending standards that the new HRF can 
use for improved implementation.    
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I. IMPLEMENTATION STANDARDS FOR THE NATIONAL 
GUARD’S HOMELAND RESPONSE FORCE 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Based on the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review and Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (OSD) decisions, 10 new 566-person domestic chemical biological radiological 
nuclear and explosive (CBRNE) and all-hazards response organizations are being created 
to meet regional response requirements beginning in September 2011 (Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, 2009). Falling under the National Guard, these 10 new Homeland 
Response Force (HRF) units will face challenges both new and similar to past 
Department of Defense (DoD) response organizations.  The careful selection of military 
and civilian response standards and an examination of lessons from other military 
CBRNE and disaster response organizations are essential to developing HRFs that are 
able to meet expectations and support America’s responders.  The HRFs $156 million 
annual budget also makes the proper selection of HRF mission roles and standards 
essential to avoid wasting taxpayer dollars (M. Reese, personal communication, 
December 18, 2009). 
America’s elected officials and public have developed strong expectations of 
military support during significant domestic emergencies.  These expectations match a 
trend beginning in the 1990s with legislative measures, creation of dedicated military 
domestic response organizations, and the military’s response to disasters.  Hurricanes 
Andrew, Katrina, Ike, and Gustav are natural disasters that involved thousands of 
Department of Defense personnel.  The World Trade Center and Pentagon incidents also 
involved immediate DoD response and thousands of DoD personnel securing airports 
nationwide.  The Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act, Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-39, 
and PDD-63 are legislative and executive actions that expanded DoD’s domestic 
response roles and created DoD CBRNE and all-hazard response units.  
Operating within the United States and its territories, the HRF must meet legally 
mandated civilian response standards for its command, medical, CBRNE, and search and 
rescue (SAR) elements.  Employed by federal and state response agencies, these include 
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the Occupational Safety, Health, Administration (OSHA), Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), and National Fire Protection Agency (NFPA) legal requirements and 
guidelines provide criteria for domestic response operations.  In addition to providing 
response standards, these requirements also provide common practices used by agencies 
the HRF will support during an incident.  The HRFs advanced classified information 
sharing and communications systems could raise intelligence oversight and civil-liberty 
concerns regarding DoD conducting domestic intelligence activities. The HRFs security 
element will also face scrutiny for potential civil-liberty and Posse Comitatus Act 
violations. Additional Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPDs) and 
Presidential Policy Directives (PPDs) specify response and planning guidelines that the 
HRF must follow to effectively complement federal and state agencies.  
Funded and organized by the DoD through the National Guard, the “dual-
missioned” HRF must also simultaneously meet DoD standards for worldwide 
deployment for combat operations.  Much of the HRF’s future organization and 
capabilities will fall under DoD’s existing architecture for developments in training, 
equipment, and funding.  Military standards will be essential to the areas of pay, 
education, promotion, and routine administration of the HRF.   
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The thesis will identify methods and standards to build a new regional DoD 
CBRNE response organization given potential gaps between DoD’s battlefield oriented 
doctrine and existing U.S. statutory response guidelines used by civilian responders. The 
intent of the thesis is to address this primary question:  
Based on the experiences of previous CBRNE and disaster response 
organizations, what standards and practices are appropriate to developing 
the HRF in order to best integrate its DoD capabilities with existing 
civilian CBRNE and all-hazard response capabilities? 
The following supplementary questions related to the development of the HRF 
will be examined in the course of addressing the primary research question:  
1. What lessons do previous CBRNE and disaster response forces provide 
that can benefit the new HRF?      
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2. What civilian and military response standards are applicable to the HRF 
regional response mission? 
3. What guidance exists for the HRF’s proper employment of advanced 
classified communication systems and information sharing capabilities 
without violating intelligence oversight laws? 
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
Helping to create an HRF that can more effectively work with existing 
organizations to save lives and contribute to response operations during a large disaster or 
CBRNE event is the main thrust of this thesis. Identifying in advance what steps that 
DoD might take during the development phases of the HRF and prior to the commitment 
of hundreds of millions of dollars could help the HRF’s initial effectiveness, save tax pay 
dollars, and avoid setbacks experienced in by previous DoD CBRNE efforts. To date, 
documents regarding the HRF have been PowerPoint concept documents or 
administrative in nature.  This thesis will be one of the first written analysis documents 
examining proposed standards for the HRF and looks at lessons learned from previous 
organizations. As response organizations and leaders seek “common operating pictures” 
and as changes occur in social media and communications; the thesis also examines the 
HRF’s potential practices to avoid increased intelligence oversight and civil liberties 
concerns.  The primary audience of this thesis is America’s response community who 
will respond with the HRF and DoD leaders working to develop the HRF. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
To date, material specific to the new 566-person HRF has yet been published in 
book or periodic form. Despite a lack of specificity of literature regarding the HRF, many 
works of fiction, nonfiction, Government Accountability Office (GAO) audits, policy 
documents, domestic intelligence policy, military doctrine, and public laws provide direct 
and tangential information cogent to the HRF concept. Literature categories, identified 
for this study of the HRF topic, can be categorized as fiction, nonfiction, editorial, 
military doctrine, GAO audits, public laws, and policy as sources of literature applicable 
to the HRF. This range of literature applicable to the HRF concept is broad, tangential, 
and, in cases very specific to the HRF, all at the same time.  Important experiences from 
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similar DoD CBRNE organizations, such as the National Guard’s Civil Support Teams 
(CST) and the active military’s CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force 
(CCMRF), provide ample information for the HRF. Literature categories germane to the 
HRF are listed in Figure 1.    
 
Figure 1.   HRF Literature Overview and Sources 
1. Fiction  
Works of fiction are literature sources tangential to the HRF topic. Fiction has 
been instrumental to identifying CBRNE threats and gaps in response capabilities.  The 
books The Hot Zone (1995) and The Cobra Event (1999) by Richard Preston were best-
selling CBRNE related novels in the 1990s. The Preston books portrayed the terrible 
implications of biological incidents occurring in the United States.  The books provide 
some factual information about people, agencies, and equipment as well as graphic 
depictions of biological agent impacts, such as victims eating their own flesh. Although 
his books were fiction and sensationalized, policymakers regarded his thoughts on 
biological threats to the U.S seriously.  Preston’s The Cobra Event was cited by the New 
York Times as influencing President Bill Clinton to stimulate federal efforts to improve 
CBRNE response capabilities (Nash, 2004).  
While works of fiction are inherently subjective, they can still demonstrate a 
perceived “gap” in preparedness and capture the public’s attention regarding potential 
scenarios that might threaten the average person. Though helping to portray a potential 
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threat, fictional works lack specific information regarding how local, state, and federal 
agencies might best manage the consequences of CBRNE incidents. Still, fiction has 
effectively conveyed catastrophic scenarios, demonstrated situations that government 
might not be prepared to handle, and has motivated authorities to address potential 
CBRNE scenarios. 
2. Nonfiction 
Works of nonfiction CBRNE topics have tangential relevance to the HRF 
development. Nonfiction CBRNE books have also highlighted CBRNE threats to the 
United States and the world. Books, such as Biohazard (1999) by former Soviet scientist 
Ken Alibek and Germs (2001) by authors Judith Miller, Steven Engelberg, and William 
Broad, have examined actual CBRNE threats that the United States could face. Mr. 
Alibek, a Soviet defector, examines his work in the Soviet Union’s biological weapons 
program between the 1970s and 1990s.  The book Germs (Miller, 2001) examines a 
variety of terrorist biological threats to the United States as well as inability to effectively 
respond to the 1999 appearance of the West Nile virus in the U.S. 
The non-fiction books have commonalities with the fiction category. Both 
sensationalize a threat, both paint scenarios that could happen, and both categories have 
influenced policy makers regarding CBRNE issues.  Also, the nonfictional accounts are 
still subjective in nature. The books espouse the opinions of authors that have worked in 
parts of the CBRNE field. Mr Alibeck’s book revealed the previously unknown vast size 
of the U.S.S.R’s biological weapons program and complemented devastation of the 
biological incident depicted in Richard Preston’s The Cobra Event (2000). Judith Miller 
and her co-authors depicted a lack of U.S. preparedness yet simultaneously criticized 
DoD and administration efforts to address CBRNE shortcomings (2001). Some of this 
literature comes from the 1990s, matching a time period of Presidential Decision 
Directives related to CBRNE response.   
Other literature regarding CBRNE threats is dated.  Older nonfiction accounts 
focus on the Aum Shinrikyo cult, unsecured Soviet weapons stockpiles, and Saddam 
Hussein’s weapons programs. More recent works focus on perceived threats such as Iran, 
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North Korea, and non-state actors employing CBRNE capabilities.  In general, the non-
fiction and fiction accounts are too CBRNE specific and lack mention of “all-hazards” 
disaster response capabilities that the HRF will provide.   
3. Policy 
The policy category of literature available for the HRF topic provides the most 
objective sources of broad information regarding how the HRF might function.  Both 
public law and guidelines form the policy category of this review. Examples of policy 
include the Homeland Security Presidential Directives Presidential (HSPDs), federal 
regulations, and public laws containing specific standards for hazardous materials 
response, safety, and all-hazards planning scenarios that are applicable to the HRF 
concept.  A central framework to the HRF’s potential mission is the National Response 
Framework (NRF), (Department of Homeland Security, 2008), which is a sub-component 
of HSPD-5, “The Management of Domestic Incidents” (Department of Homeland 
Security [DHS], 2003). The NRF and other policy documents contain emergency support 
functions, interagency planning information, and information that can shape an HRF that 
functions as effectively with local, state, regional, and federal entities to incidents within 
the U.S. The Insurrection Act of 1807 (10 United States Code [U.S.C.] § 335) and the 
seemly opposite Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 (18 U.S.C. § 1385) are profound laws that 
will impact the operations of HRF in domestic response mission.  Both laws permit or 
restrict military domestic employments and have significant but different meanings to 
both federal forces working for the President and state-level National Guard force that 
typically answer to a governor. 
While the policy category provides goals and standards, it lacks specifics to the 
HRF concept, such as organizational constructs, equipment selection, and availability for 
overseas deployments. Domestic U.S. policy does not mention how best to integrate the 
military’s doctrine, battlefield equipment, and often non-OSHA compliant work practices 
into a response. 
Intelligence is a subcategory of policy with strong influence on military doctrine. 
Existing technologies and potential mission requirements can push the HRF into the 
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conflicted area of domestic intelligence and information sharing by DoD forces. This area 
is sensitive due to public concerns regarding the role of the military and civil liberties and 
was an issue during the 2007 and 2008 assignment of the CBRNE Consequence 
Management Response Force (CCMRF) under U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM). 
Given the HRF’s regional CBRNE command and control mission, the HRF will use 
extensive communications and information technologies to help provide a common 
operating picture (COP.) An HRF with assigned CERFPs and CSTs may operate across 
large cities, state, or region rely upon a classified Secure Internet Protocol Router (SIPR) 
network that use the Trojan Spirit system, run thru Fort Belvoir, Virginia, to 
communicate.  SIPR is widely used for both intelligence and information sharing.  A 
CBRNE event could bring a significant need to receive and disseminate classified 
information with civilian and military agencies across hundreds of miles.  
4. DoD Literature and Doctrine 
The U.S. Army’s For Official Use Only (FOUO) Training Circular (TC) 2-91.501 
Intelligence Handbook for Civil Support Operations (Headquarters Department of the 
Army, 2009) will be essential to the HRF’s proper employment of classified information 
and intelligence information. This document reflects both U.S. policy and military 
doctrine. The TC 2-91 provides methods to employ military aircraft, unmanned aerial 
systems (UAS) systems, and other intelligence related platforms in domestic role without 
violating U.S. laws regarding domestic intelligence operations (Headquarters Department 
of the Army, 2009).  The TC 2-91 drops the commonly used DoD term intelligence 
preparation of the battlefield (IPB) for set of domestic terms that avoid the word 
intelligence altogether in favor of the term incident assessment and awareness (IAA), 
which seems to indicate information sharing and COP functions instead of intelligence. It 
also drops the term intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) from domestic 
operations. Transforming U.S. Intelligence (Sims & Gerber, 2005) is another book 
appropriate to the HRF that describes the paradox on properly employing intelligence 
resources domestically while not undermining the institution of democracy or civil 
liberties. The chapter titled “Intelligence and Homeland Defense” from Transforming  
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U.S. Intelligence provides possible solutions to proper employment of intelligence 
resources that can speed a response to a domestic incident within the framework of a 
democracy (Sims & Gerber, 2005).   
Military doctrine provides information from other DoD CBRNE response 
organizations that is immediately applicable to the HRF. Concepts for operational 
employment of the HRF, logistics support, equipment acquisition, and policy to integrate 
the HRF into a federal or state led response are found in doctrine.  Doctrine includes 
manuals such as the Field Manual (FM) 3-28, Civil Support Operations Manual 
(Headquarters Department of the Army, 2010) and DoD Directive 3025 Defense Support 
to Civil Authorities (U.S. Department of Defense, 2011) provide information applicable 
to the HRF. Military knowledge centers such as the Army’s Center for Lessons Learned 
(CALL) have also developed general disaster response handbooks pertinent to the HRF 
and its personnel.  
Military doctrine can conflict with U.S. policies and laws regarding domestic 
CBRNE response. Doctrine is generated by the Secretary of Defense or subordinate DoD 
agencies to direct procedures for how units might function; however, doctrine cannot 
supplant U.S. laws. In many cases, doctrine and equipment developed for the battlefield 
might not meet OSHA and EPA requirements required to protect U.S. responders and the 
public.  While doctrine is important to developing an HRF, it is important to remember 
that doctrine cannot replace statutory requirements used inside the U.S. 
5. GAO Audits  
GAO audits provide important information regarding existing DoD CBRNE and 
all-hazards response organizations that precede the HRF. Two GAO audits address DoD 
CBRNE capabilities that the HRF will integrate or parallel in structure. A 2006 GAO 
audit of the National Guard’s CSTs and a 2009 GAO audit of the NORTHCOM  CBRNE 
Consequence Management Response Force both provide information essential to the 
HRF concept (U.S. Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2006; 2009).  The GAO 
audits are detailed critiques that provide insights to the state-level CSTs and national-
level CCMRF. These critiques might help focus the HRF as it builds a regional-level 
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capability.  As a shortcoming, the GAO audits provide examples of what the HRF might 
avoid as opposed to what examples the HRF should follow.  Also, the GAO audits 
provide little information on how a regional CBRNE and all-hazards response 
organization might best operate.  
Presently, very little editorial literature exists on the HRF concept.  Editorial 
literature on the CST and CCMRF as well as the Marine’s Chemical, Biological, Incident 
Response Force (CBIRF) is prevalent. Like the GAO audits, much of this editorial is 
critical in nature and provides reactive guidance on what the HRF might avoid, instead of 
what the HRF might follow. Editorial on the HRF’s predecessors can be found in DoD 
journals, civilian periodicals, and American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) Websites.  A 
heterogeneous nature and articulated opinions are the hallmark of editorial literatures.  
Editorial literature can provide critiques and insights not found in the homogenous 
military and policy literatures.  
The HRF’s regional CBRNE and all-hazards response mission is new, and so 
literature written specifically for the HRF does not exist; however, the existing literature 
provides policy, goals, and constructs importable to the HRF concept. Still much of this 
literature is focused on CBRNE and does not address the HRF’s all-hazards response 
missions that might be found in New Madrid Seismic or a Japan-type earthquake 
scenario. However, much of the equipment, training, organizational design, and 
operations of these predecessors will be appropriate to new HRF. While the HRF is a new 
organization, experience from these legacy organizations will provide a pathway for 
development and construction of the HRF.  The present absence of HRF editorial and 
other literatures will probably end shortly as two HRF’s will be created in 2011 in 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Regions X and V.   
E. HYPOTHESES  
America’s elected officials and public will have expectations of effectiveness 
from the HRF. By paying heed to DoD’s preceding response organizations and by 
carefully selecting a combination of civilian and military response standards and 
practices, the regional HRF can more effectively support America’s responders.  
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Following disasters, political leaders, and the public often demand inquiries into 
perceived deficiencies.  Additionally, federal and DoD agencies are periodically 
examined for fiscal responsibility and effectiveness.  With the selection of proper 
standards for training and oversight, the HRF can better meet the demands of routine or 
post-incident inquiry.  The HRF is proceeded by four other DoD all-hazard and or 
CBRNE response units.  Two of these units, the DoD’s active-component CBRNE 
Consequence Management Response Force and the National Guard’s Civil Support 
Teams (CST) have been subjected to DoD and Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
audits resulting in many negative remarks that required corrective actions (GAO 2006; 
2009).  Following the 2006 Second Lebanon War, the Israeli Defense Force’s (IDF) 
Home Front Command (HFC) also received critical comments in report from Israel’s 
civilian Winograd Commission.  This precedence of audits indicates the HRF program 
should select sound standards and response practices to avoid future audit related 
criticisms and corrective actions.  
The HRF’s hybrid civil-military and regional mission presents new challenges 
and opportunities for DoD to support America’s communities and responders.  With a 
large annual budget, many personnel, and extensive response capabilities, the HRF must 
have carefully selected standards for future development.  Audits critical of DoD’s older 
domestic response organizations reinforce a need for clear standards.   
F. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will employ a qualitative research method using case studies of DoD’s 
existing CBRNE organizations and the IDF’s HFC to draw conclusions that might be 
relevant to creating the new HRF. Audits and articles found in defense journals and open 
media regarding CBRNE and all-hazards response organizations provide the basis for a 
case study that can identify past patterns and policies of inherent importance to the HRF. 
As mentioned in the literature review, GAO and DoD audits provide statistics and 
insights regarding the strengths and shortcomings of the CST and the CCMRF. A review 
of the critical and positive comments found in past GAO and DoD audits of DoD’s 
CBRNE capabilities can identify practices the HRF might adopt or avoid. The fact that 
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the HRF is required to respond in concert with DoD’s existing CBRNE and all-hazards 
response units also makes a case study method applicable to its development.  
G. HOMELAND RESPONSE FORCE BACKGROUND INFORMATION  
The HRF reflects an evolution in U.S. military units with CBRNE and disaster 
related homeland security missions that stem from Presidential Decision Directives and 
legislation in the 1990s. Created in 1996, the Marine’s 350-person Chemical Biological 
Incident Response Force (CBIRF) was the first military CBRNE unit with a domestic 
CBRNE response mission.  In 1998, Congress created the National Guard Civil Support 
Teams (CSTs) to identify CBRNE agents, provide communications, and advise civilian 
officials.  To increase CBNRE capabilities and provide decontamination, medical 
treatment, and SAR, the National Guard created CBRNE Enhanced Response Force 
Packages (CERFPs) in 2003.  In 2007, the DoD established a fully-staffed “active duty” 
or federal Consequence Management Response Force (CCMRF) with 5200 personnel to 
provide a DoD CBRNE response to a larger national CBRNE incident.  The CCMRF was 
restructured in 2010 and renamed as the Defense Consequence Management Response 
Force (DCRF) and controlled by the President, the DCRF represents a federal military 
response to large CBRNE incidents (Coble, 2011).    
Despite a decade of evolving CBRNE capabilities that addressed state and large 
federal disasters, a regional response gap existed.  The Columbia space shuttle disaster 
and Hurricane Katrina demonstrated the need for a regional CBRNE and disaster 
response capability.  Both incidents occurred across entire FEMA regions, required 
advanced communications and interagency coordination and employed up to 22 of the 
state-level CSTs.  A 2007 article, titled Brigade Headquarters for National Guard Civil 
Support teams: a Homeland Security Imperative, by Lieutenant Colonel James Campbell 
reflected the need for greater control of CSTs and CBRNE elements response across 
FEMA regions (2007).   
Proposed by the OSD for implementation, the HRF was selected from several 
National Guard and active military alternatives in 2009 to fill a regional CBRNE 
capability between state and federal level responses. (See Figure 2). Existing CBRNE 
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units presently meet state and large national CBRNE incidents.  As part of a 
comprehensive CBRNE capability known within DoD as the “CBRN enterprise,” the 
National Guard will maintain an existing force structure of 57 Weapon of Mass 
Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs or CSTs) and 17 CBRNE Enhanced 
Response for Packages (CERFPs) in addition to the 10 new HRFs filled by 10,000 
soldiers and airmen.  
 
Figure 2.   OSD Policy Hybrid Alternative (From Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2009) 
Residing within a FEMA region, the HRF will serve as the command and control 
(C2) headquarters for CSTs, CERFPs, and conventional military units providing support 
through Emergency Management Assistance Compacts (EMAC) to a regional CBRNE 
incident or disaster.  Figure 2 depicts the structure and concept of a Georgia-based HRF 
and the existing CSTs and CERFPs within FEMA Region IV.  As part of the OSD 
directive, the National Guard must transform 10 existing “brigade” sized units into the 
HRFs by the year 2014 (M. Reese, personal communication, December 18, 2009).  OSD 
has stipulated that two HRFs be fully mission-capable by October 1, 2011 (M. Reese, 
personal communication, December 18, 2009). 
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Figure 3.   HRF Structure and Operational Concept (From National Guard Bureau 2009) 
Prior to the HRF, all of DoD’s homeland security organizations experienced 
significant setbacks and controversy from within and outside the government.  Two of 
DoD’s existing CBRNE organizations have experienced GAO audits.  In 2000, the 
Army’s Inspector General recommended elimination of the CST program based on poor 
training, doctrine, and flawed equipment (Lieberman, 2001). With little to contribute to 
direct combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, some Marine leaders questioned the 
need for the CBIRF.  In 2004, the active Army blocked the development of the Guard’s 
CERFP equipment, training, and organization (Jones, 2004).  An October 2009 GAO 
audit of the CCMRF indicated shortcomings in regional response, funding, and training 
demands (GAO, 2009). The ACLU and other civil liberties organizations questioned the 
first ever assignment of federal military forces under NORTHCOM for a domestic 
response incident (ACLU, 2008).  This precedence illustrates the challenges, oversight 
and controversy the HRF will face.  
 
 14
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 15
II. PREVIOUS DOD CBRNE AND ALL-HAZARDS RESPONSE 
ORGANIZATIONS 
The HRF is preceded by several DoD CBNRE organizations that provide 
examples of implementation successes and setbacks as well as mission “scoping” that the 
HRF can follow. A common theme for these organizations is the conflicts that can arise 
when deploying U.S. military forces domestically. Military organizations, culture, 
equipment, and personnel have traditionally followed different guidelines than civilian 
organizations. American military organizations tend to deploy outside the U.S., where 
they follow doctrine and the Geneva Conventions instead of OSHA, EPA, and other 
standards for environmental response and civilian work place protection. Though rugged, 
military equipment is not always designed to complement civilian response measures and 
might only provide “survival” levels of protection. Much of the military’s CBRNE 
protective clothing and detection equipment was developed to meet Cold War battlefield-
level detection that might be measured with alarms and bars and not the part-per-million 
(PPM) or REMs used by civilian responders. America’s civil liberty laws, federal 
authorities, state authorities, and intelligence oversight laws also provide sharp areas of 
contention for domestic military employment. Regarding domestic CBRNE units, some 
military leaders have stated that DoD should mainly focus on overseas missions and let 
response agencies such as FEMA or the EPA handle homeland security-related missions. 
Leadership from civilian agencies charged with statutory response roles also question the 
need for dedicated military CBRNE and homeland security forces when civilian agencies 
already fill those roles. Previous DoD CBRNE organizations have encountered public 
criticisms, but they have also had some notable response successes and the HRF can 
benefit from the experiences of these organizations.  
In the 1990s, new presidential directives and legislative actions specified that the 
U.S. military support domestic response to CBRNE incidents. The CBIRF and the WMD 
CST program (CST Program) originated from the 1995 Presidential Decision Directive 
(PDD) 39, Counter-terrorism Policy, the 1996 Nunn Lugar Domenici Act, Defense 
Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act and, more specifically, the 1998 PDD 62, 
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Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans Overseas 
(Congressional Record 1996, White House, 1995; 1998a). These directives provided a 
broad framework for a national-level response that integrates military forces for potential 
CBRNE response and homeland security missions. The PDDs and the resulting creation 
of the Marine Corps’ Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) and Civil 
Support Teams were steps in a strategy to offset acknowledged gaps in the nation’s 
capabilities to respond to CBRNE use against the United States and its territories.   
A. THE CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL INCIDENT RESPONSE FORCE 
Created in 1996, the Marine’s 350-person CBIRF was the nation’s first military 
CBRNE unit with a partially-domestic CBRNE response mission. Within CBIRF, the 
Marines created the first true CBRNE task force with decontamination, analytical, search 
and rescue (SAR), medical, explosive ordinance detachment (EOD), CBRNE detection, 
and security element. Located at Indian Head, Maryland, the CBRIF is “dual-missioned” 
with both domestic and overseas CBRNE mission requirements. With advanced civilian-
equivalent hazardous materials (HAZMAT) training and equipment, the CBIRF has 
deployed to multiple national special security events (NSSE) and CBRNE-related 
incidents. These include Olympic Games, the 2001 anthrax attack at the Hart Senate 
building, the 2004 Dirksen Senate Office Building ricin letters, and a clandestine CBRNE 
laboratory in Fallujah, Iraq in 2004. (CBIRF, 2004)     
 
Figure 4.   CBIRF Task Organization (From CBIRF, 2008)  
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Located close to the Nation Capital Region (NCR), the CBIRF is considered 
essential to any CBRNE or other significant hazard that might impact the capital region. 
Aligned closely with protecting the nation’s capital and federal-level response missions, 
the CBIRF and its suite of resources might be underutilized for both its domestic and 
overseas missions. Consequently, outside of federal properties the CBRIF has had few 
local, state, or natural disaster responses due to its federal status and unique NCR 
mission. Despite its status as the original CBRNE task force with a central domestic 
mission, CBIRF has escaped the oversight questions and controversies that have 
hampered other CBRNE elements. With extensive capabilities and demonstrated 
performance, the CBIRF has become the basis of comparison for all other military 
CBRNE organizations (S. Pitts, personal communication, March 9, 2011).  
B. THE CIVIL SUPPORT TEAM  
The National Guard’s CSTs, formally known as Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Civil Support Teams, were announced by President Clinton at the May 1998 Naval 
Academy graduation ceremony as a program created to meet the growing threat of 
terrorist use of CBRNE. The CSTs were originally designated rapid assessment and 
initial detection (RAID) teams but the name was changed to better reflect a civil support 
role and for a less aggressive title as a domestic military organization. By June of 1999, 
the first 10 of a total of 57 future CSTs were fully staffed, equipped, and training for the 
CBRNE incidents that soon impacted America. The 57 CSTs employ 22 active-duty 
National Guard personnel to identify CBRNE agents, provide communications, and 
advise civilian officials. Designed to deploy within 90 minutes to the immediate needs of 
Local, state, or federal agencies, the CSTs are a state-level military organization that does 
not fall under Posse Comitatus. Unlike all other DoD CBRNE organizations and the 
HRF, the CST program is a statutorily-based program directed to exist by following 
language in PPD 62: 
The Department of Defense, in coordination with other Federal 
Departments and agencies, will provide training to metropolitan first 
responders and will maintain trained military units to assist State and local 
responders. One example is the National Guard concept of initially 
forming 10 Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) teams in each 
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FEMA Region. These teams are designed to provide rapid response to a 
WMD incident and assist State and local responders. (White House, 
1998a) 
The language of PPD-62 makes the CSTs unique since DoD’s other CBRNE 
organizations can be eliminated through budget cuts. Additionally the CST is the only 
CBRNE element with an exclusively domestic CBNRE response mission. DoD’s other 
CBRNE units are dual missioned with both overseas and domestic missions. The CSTs 
are restricted by law to remain in the US and it territories for response operations whereas 
all other CBRNE elements might be deployed overseas when a domestic disaster occurs. 
Furthermore, the CSTs follow an Incident Command System (ICS) based structure and 
develop ICS-based documents such the Incident Action Plan and Site Safety Plan used by 
civilian response agencies at all levels.  
 
Figure 5.   Civil Support Team (From Hudoba & Reese, 2007)  
The CST program began with a narrow scope of CBRNE response missions. 
Designed to work for civilian authorities at the local, state, and federal levels while 
meeting all civilian hazardous materials (HAZMAT) response standards, the first 10 
CSTs were distributed to each FEMA region. Subsequent CSTs were distributed to three 
states and the territories of Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. In addition, 
Florida, California, and New York are the states that received two CSTs. The 
methodology of creating a military unit with civilian interoperability proved challenging  
 
 19
but invaluable. Able to integrate fully with a civilian response; CSTs are adept at 
bringing DoD laboratories, training, and resources to bear during large scale incidents. 
The CST’s mission statement reads as: 
Support civil authorities at a domestic chemical, biological, radiological, 
nuclear, and high-explosive (CBRNE) incident site by identifying CBRNE 
agents/substances, assessing current and projected consequences, advising 
on response measures, and assisting with appropriate requests for state and 
federal support. (National Guard Bureau, 2007)  
The unique nature and the untested methods of state-level CSTs brought problems 
and harsh review in late 2000. Large monetary and personnel resources were expended in 
training and equipment for the new mission. The CSTs were provided advanced 
analytical technologies such as portable gas chromatograph mass spectrum (GCMS) and 
polymerase chain reaction (PCR) analytical devices. Previously used in fixed 
laboratories, these cutting edge technologies were fielded to the CST for response 
operations without significant DoD testing. A scathing January 2001 report by the DoD 
Inspector General report derided the CST program as an extravagant waste of personnel 
and resources on a poorly developed concept (DoD Inspector General, 2001). In the book 
Germs (2001), author Judith Miller criticized the CST program and claimed that it should 
have ended during the Clinton administration (Miller et al., 2001) These criticisms soon 
subsided.  
CST successes in New York on September 11, 2001, and in hundreds of 
subsequent responses prompted by anthrax and ricin events brought credit to the new 
program. Initially criticized as expensive, the CST program served as a platform for 
equipment and technology spin-offs that have subsequently benefitted FEMA, U.S. 
Northern Command, the EPA, local fire departments, and other agencies. Additionally, it 
was generally recognized that the federally funded, state-level CSTs brought DoD’s first 
response along with expensive advanced technologies not often found at local levels or 
matched by federal military CBRNE elements. 
Containing robust communications, scientific analytical systems, and medical 
capabilities the CSTs were designed to respond to CBRNE threats. Yet the CSTs suffered 
the short coming of too narrow of a mission scope. The CST’s communications and 
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laboratory capabilities at an incident can exceed the organization’s original CBRNE 
response mission assets. In addition to CBRNE events, the CSTs were frequently 
employed for regional-level responses such as the space shuttle disaster, Hurricane 
Katrina, Hurricane Gustav, and wild fires. The CST’s advanced mobile communication 
vehicle, the Unified Command Suite (UCS), provided invaluable secured 
communications capability essential to command and control and a common operating 
picture (COP) of local and regional incidents. At “ground zero” the New York National 
Guard’s second CST proved invaluable by providing HAZMAT assessments and Secure 
Internet Protocol Router (SIPR) classified communications for the FBI and other 
agencies.  The non-CBRNE nature of some of these all-hazards missions actually 
violated the CST’s congressionally directed mission. A 2006 GAO audit found high 
levels of readiness in the CST program but also identified confusion over the CST’s 
increasing role in disaster response missions (GAO, 2006).  Following the deployment of 
elements of 22 CSTs to Hurricane Katrina, Congress changed the CST mission, including 
all-hazards missions, as part of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2007 (National Defense Authorization Act, 2007).  
During response events such as the anthrax attacks, multiple NSSEs, and natural 
disasters, the CSTs have proven their ability to assess hazards, provide communications, 
and speed recovery from attacks and natural disasters. Extensive individual, collective 
training, and frequent external evaluations conducted by U.S. Army North contributed to 
these successes. The performance measures used to train and evaluate CSTs were 
developed using National Fire Protection Agency, EPA, OSHA, and DoD standards for 
HAZMAT and CBRNE response. CST personnel attend hundreds of hours of HAZMAT 
training and additional training based on specific duties. Even so, gaps still existed in 
training and proficiency with the CST advanced CBRNE detection and analytical 
capabilities. Better performance measures were eventually developed by the CSTs 
themselves, the program’s interagency Civil Support Team Work Group (CSTWG). To 
better meet CDC requirements, the CSTs adopted the International Organization for 
Standardization 17025 laboratory standards for the CST’s mobile CBRNE Analytical Lab 
Suite (ALS). The internal implementation of Proficiency Analytical Testing (PAT) of 
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CBRNE equipment and increased laboratory standards reflect performance measure gaps 
that were identified and addressed internally by the CSTWG and National Guard Bureau 
rather than an external agency like the GAO (B. Webb, personal communication, August 
18, 2009).  
Supported by the President and Congress, the CSTs were well implemented 
despite initial criticisms. The teams have filled WMD and all-hazards response gaps at 
the state and local levels while surging for larger regional events. The utility of the CST 
program to respond to national needs is evident in thousands of missions over an 11-year 
period. Thru the CSTWG, the CSTs and National Guard Bureau internally directed 
changes to improve CBRNE-related analytical and laboratory procedures to address gaps 
that were not addressed by legislation, PPDs, or the GAO.  The initially narrow CBRNE 
mission of the CSTs was broadened by Congress to accommodate natural disaster 
missions. In the words of a Coast Guard Commander of an all-hazards response unit, 
“The CST’s employment of ICS and advanced training and equipment make them 
popular and viable in events like Katrina, Ike, Gustav and the New Horizon Oil Spill” (V. 
Kammer, personal communication, November 8, 2010).  Combining military resources at 
a state level with the civilian incident command system (ICS) response model, 
equipment, and training increased CST accessibility and interoperability with responders 
at all levels of government.  To date, the CST’s combination of advanced 
communications, laboratory, and technical capabilities relating to domestic CBRNE and 
all-hazards incidents remain unmatched anywhere in DoD. 
C. THE CBRNE ENHANCED RESPONSE FORCE PACKAGE 
The National Guard created 12 CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages 
(CERFPs) out of traditional part-time Army National Guard and Air National Guard units 
in 2003 as a follow-on force to the CSTs and to emulate some of the capabilities found in 
CBIRF.  Established by the Director of the National Guard, Lieutenant General Stephen 




medical units to provide a “task force” of SAR, security, decontamination and medical 
treatment capabilities within six to 12 hours of a domestic CBRNE or all-hazards incident 
with the following mission statement: 
On order, respond to a CBRNE incident and assist local, state, and federal 
agencies in conducting consequence management by providing 
capabilities to conduct personnel decontamination, emergency medical 
services, and casualty search and extraction. (National Guard Bureau, 
2007)  
According to Malcholm Reese of the National Guard Bureau, who is widely 
considered a key founder of the CERFP program, “prior the HRF, the CERFPs were 
intended to serve as a bridging capability between state and federal response resources 
for large disasters” (M. Reese, personal communication, December 19, 2010).  In 2006, 
another five CERFPs were added for a total of 17 CERFPs. Distributed across the 10 
FEMA regions, the 186-person CERFPs leverage the CST’s existing detection, 
analytical, and communications capabilities to help manage the consequence of a local, 
state, or regional-level CBRNE event or disaster. 
Intended to place minimum training and equipment impacts upon dual-missioned 
conventional units, the CERFPs are lightly equipped with civilian personal protective 
equipment (PPE) and predominately hand-held SAR and CBRNE equipment. The 
CERFP’s Air National Guard medical organization mission remained essentially 
unchanged in both its overseas and domestic missions. With a goal of readiness for 
domestic CBRNE incidents without diminishing a unit’s training for overseas missions, 
the CERFP unit was provided an additional two weeks of training time and provided 
additional full-time staff members intended to assist and train the predominantly part-
time National Guard soldiers on their CBRNE mission. The CERFP’s organization and 
mission information follows (Figure 6): 
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Figure 6.   CERFP Organization (From Hudoba & Reese, 2007) 
Unlike the congressionally-directed CST program, the CERFPs started as a “pilot 
program” exclusive to the National Guard that came without external support or funding 
from DoD. Initially the units assigned to CERFP duties did not have access to funds to 
pay for daily CBRNE equipment maintenance, nor did they exist as a formally budgeted 
and authorized DoD program of record. A lack of formal DoD recognition for the CERFP 
proved an initial drawback.  
 
Figure 7.   CERFP Team National Coverage (From Hudoba & Reese, 2007) 
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In 2004, the Army blocked the funding, equipment and doctrinal support for the 
National Guard’s CERFPs. With some justification, Army leaders cited that requisite 
resources from DoD were not provided for CERFPs. A May 2004, U.S. Army Training 
and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) letter from Lieutenant General Jones clearly stated 
that no development or support for the CERFP would come from the Army’s TRADOC. 
Paragraphs from the 2004 TRADOC letter raised questions, still unanswered, regarding 
dual-missioned domestic CBRNE military roles:  
4. The proposed creation of a task organized first responder capabilities 
drawn from warfighting units has potential ramifications for both the 
Army and Regional Combatant Commanders for which these forces may 
be apportioned. This type of dual missioning is a growing concern as we 
work to delineate the Army’s roles and responsibilities in support of 
Homeland Security operations.   
5. First responder programs are under the purview of the Department of 
Homeland Security, Office of Domestic Preparedness. In the context 
presented, the CERFP is just such a program. The utility of expending 
critical Army resources in support of a non-Department of Defense or 
Army mission will be weighed accordingly.  (U.S. Army TRADOC, 2004) 
Heated debates ensued over the interpretations of the National Guard’s CERFP 
initiative and 2004 TRADOC letter until finality in guidance on the CERFP program 
came from Congress.  
By 2006 Congressional leaders determined the CERFPs were essential and the 
pilot program became a funded program of record. Both in authorization and 
appropriation the language from the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act reflects 
this transition:  
The committee recommends an increase of 19.8 million for this (CERFP) 
program. Of that amount the committee recommends an increase of 9.5 
million to establish five additional NG CERFP teams and an increase of 
10.3 million dollars to provide sustainment funding for the 12 existing NG 
CERFP teams. The NG CERFP pilot program was initiated in fiscal year 
2004 and has proven to be a valuable asset for federal and state authorities. 
(National Defense Authorization Act, 2005)  
As in the creation of the CST program, Congressional action provided specific 
guidance on budgeting and provided additional full-time CERFP staff. These actions 
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eliminated many of the internal DoD obstacles to funding and equipment issues that had 
pestered the CERFP program. Further support for the CERFP came in an August 17, 
2006 Joint Requirement Oversight Council (JROC) memorandum signed by Admiral 
Giambastiani. DoD’s Joint Staff recognized the CERFP program and directed detailed 
doctrine, organization, training, equipment, and DoD support for the program (DoD Joint 
Staff, 2006). By 2008, the CERFP program had become a fully vested DoD program 
under the purview of the Army National Guard.  
Lieutenant General Blum’s internal program funding and the National Guard’s 
original use of dual missioned forces for CBRNE roles caused initial setbacks for the 
CERFPs.  Still the concept and the inception of the CERFP demonstrated the application 
of lessons learned from the CST program, CBIRF, and Israel’s use of military forces in 
its Home Front Command (HFC). DoD, CST, and civilian response personnel helped 
develop the CERFP’s concept of operations (CONOPS), training, equipment, and 
organization. Initially operating with limited funding, the CERFPs employed equipment, 
logistics, and acquisition methods established by the CST. The U.S. Army North 
validated CERFP readiness during major national level exercises (NLE) exercises. A 
cross section of the CERFP’s founders include Lieutenant Colonel Harold Molbert, who 
reflected on some of the positive lessons that the CST program derived from the negative 
2000 DoD IG Audit—“The 2000 DoD IG audit of the CSTs provided a valuable lesson—
we wanted to establish clear cut and unassailable standards for the CERFP that avoid 
undue and unproductive criticisms” (H. Molbert, personal communication, July 20, 
2005). 
Congressional support proved decisive to the success of the CERFP program. The 
CERFPs have had many successful missions and are demanded for NSSE’s and state-
level events. CERFP NSSE support includes the 2008 Republican and Democratic 
National Conventions and the deployment of four CERFPs for the 2009 Presidential 
Inauguration. While portions of CERFPs deployed to Hurricane Katrina, other CERFPs 
supported the response to a 2010 Tsunami in American Samoa and a 2007 Jacksonville, 
Florida parking garage collapse (M. Ladd, personal communication, February 15, 2011). 
The deployment of elements of the Florida CERFP to the 2010 New Horizon Oil Spill 
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stands out as a critical CERFP deployment, which again demonstrates the utility that 
organizations originally designed for CBRNE use can provide. To date, the CERFPs have 
not responded to an Oklahoma City-type bombing event or a large earthquake. In either 
scenario, the National Guard’s 17 CERFPs, with some 3100 personnel dispersed across 
the U.S., are now postured to bring lifesaving SAR, decontamination, and medical care to 
American citizens.  
D. THE CBRNE CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT RESPONSE FORCE  
In 2007, the DoD established a fully-staffed Consequence Management Response 
Force (CCMRF) with 5200 personnel to provide a larger joint DoD CBRNE and all-
hazards response capability to large or multiple disasters. Despite the CBIRF, CST, and 
CERFP successes, the CCMRF was created to bring larger scale federal military 
capabilities to larger CBRNE incidents. Integrating the Marines’ CBIRF as its central 
CBRNE element along with conventional battlefield military forces, the dual-missioned 
CCMRF also contained dedicated aviation assets, mortuary support, and mapping 
capabilities from conventional forces. Operationally controlled by the U.S. Northern 
Command (NORTHCOM) and its subsidiary land component command, U.S. Army 
North, the CCMRF represented the first large domestic military force intended for 
deployment on U.S. soil since the Civil War.   
 
Figure 8.   CCMRF Structure (From Anderson, 2009)  
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Falling under a U.S. Army North headquarters named Joint Task Force Civil 
Support; the CCMRF contained a Task Force Operations, Task Force Medical, and a 
Task Force Aviation. The Marine CBIRF is integrated into the Task Force Operations. 
DoD originally intended that an initial CCMRF be followed by two more CCMRFs, 
comprised mainly of National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve elements. This reflected a 
DoD goal of responding to simultaneous domestic incidents with additional CCMRFs 
filled by state-level military forces working for the President in an activated federal 
status.  
The 1st Brigade Combat Team (BCT) from Third Infantry Division at Fort 
Stewart, Georgia was the first federal conventional military element to comprise the first 
CCMRF. This Army BCT was intended to fill the CCMRF mission for a year between 
deployments to Iraq. Like the CBIRF, other CCMRF assets were pulled from across DoD 
to fill the CCMRF. These included Air Force engineer units, Navy weather teams, and 
members of the Defense Logistics Agency. Training active duty soldiers, typically 
employed in counter-insurgency operations, to meet domestic operations requirements 
between deployments provided challenges. The first full-scale CCMRF rehearsal exercise 
was conducted at Fort Stewart, Georgia in October 2008. The exercise demonstrated the 
challenges of pulling organizations together from across all of DoD for a domestic 
response mission between overseas deployments. CCMRF members practiced 
decontamination, SAR, medical, security operations, and crowd control during a large 
scale domestic scenario. Military combat engineer units practiced debris removal tasks.  
The CCMRF concept and mission demonstrates valid concerns and some 
contradictions in employing federal forces within the U.S. Despite the use of federal and 
state military forces at the 1992 Los Angeles Riots and during the Civil Rights era, the 
CCMRF evoked strong reactions from both liberal and conservative elements. An 
October 2008, Army Times interview with the Colonel Roger Cloutier, the commander of 
the CCMRF’s conventional combat forces best illustrates the dilemmas found in 
employing the military for homeland security missions:   
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The 1st BCT’s soldiers also will learn how to use “the first ever nonlethal 
package that the Army has fielded,” 1st BCT commander Col. Roger 
Cloutier said, referring to crowd and traffic control equipment and 
nonlethal weapons designed to subdue unruly or dangerous individuals 
without killing them, “It’s a new modular package of nonlethal 
capabilities that they’re fielding. They’ve been using pieces of it in Iraq, 
but this is the first time that these modules were consolidated and this 
package fielded, and because of this mission we’re undertaking we were 
the first to get it.” (Cavallaro, 2008)  
Colonel Cloutier’s comments resulted in an uproar and brought about expressions 
of concern from the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) (Christensen, 2008). 
Conservative media had an equally negative response to the comments and the CCMRF 
mission. Both ends of the political spectrum felt the CCMRF encroached too closely on 
Posse Comitatus Act and disliked that an organized military force stood ready under 
NORTHCOM for domestic missions.  
An October 2009 GAO audit of the CCMRF dealt a further blow to the CCMRF 
mission. The audit reflected many of the CCMRF challenges.  The GAO audit questioned 
whether a centrally located CCMRF could respond nationwide in time to positively 
impact a crisis (GAO, 2009). The GAO also found that the training and rotation demands 
of Iraq and Afghanistan impeded the availability of active duty forces for the CCMRF. 
Units originally assigned to the CCMRF for a year were quickly pulled from the CCMRF 
to support overseas missions. The GAO audit also found confusion over appropriate 
doctrine, training, and funding (GAO, 2009). The CCMRF’s poor linkage to existed 
civilian agency plans was also noted.  Shortly thereafter, the Army’s TRADOC issued an 
October 23, 2009, “cease work” order on the CCMRF partially because of GAO audits 
findings and emerging domestic CBRNE response force structures (TRADOC, 2009). 
The CCMRF represented the most contentious of all of DoD’s CBRNE units and 
faced all of the difficulties that detracted from the CST and CERFP programs and which 
were seemly amplified by the organization’s larger size. Beyond routine funding, 
equipping, and training problems recognized by the GAO, the CCMRF raised Posse 
Comitatus and civil liberties concerns at many levels of government and by political 
interests. In late 2009, the Secretary of Defense announced the creation of 10 National 
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Guard HRF units over the recommendations of NORTHCOM’s commander, General 
Victor “Gene” Renuart for a continuance of three federal level CCMRFs and a reduction 
in state-level CERFPs (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2009). In 2010, the CCMRF 
was restructured and renamed the Defense CBRNE Response Force (DCRF) and the two 
follow-on CCMRFs were dropped for smaller general purpose support elements. The 
original concept of three large CCMRFs acting as a strong federal force for domestic 
missions had ceased in November 2009 in favor of a new balance of 55 percent state and 
45 percent federal forces in “CBRN Enterprise” (Figure 9) that includes the regionally 
based state HRF concept.  
 
Figure 9.   The CBRN Enterprise (From National Guard Bureau & U.S. NORTCOM, 2011)  
E. LESSONS FROM PREVIOUS CBRNE ORGANIZATIONS  
Congressional and Presidential action during the 1990s and the subsequent decade 
thrust DoD into a more specified domestic role than it had known before. The Marine’s 
CBIRF and the National Guard CSTs represent a “ground-shifting” evolution in military 
support to civil authorities with critically valuable equipment and training spin-offs based 
on these actions. When the National Guard and active-duty Army components had 
different views on the CERFP’s dual-missioned use of military forces for domestic 
missions, Congress again took a lead by funding and expanding the CERFP programs. 
Despite negative audits and reports of CBRNE units, the National Guard’s CBRNE 
 30
dedicated CSTs and dual-missioned CERFPs have demonstrated accessibility and utility 
as response units at state and regional-sized incidents. Although the Marine Corp’s 
excellent federal-level dual-missioned CBIRF has remained unequivocally beyond 
criticism, the larger federal and dual-missioned CCMRF received harsh approbation from 
many quarters.  
The HRF must integrate the valuable lessons learned from the CBIRF, CSTs, 
CERFPs, and CCMRF. The state level CSTs and CERFPs represent an asset that 
governors can employ rapidly to the majority of America’s disasters without the civil 
liberty concerns so detrimental to the CCMRF. The CCMRF mission demonstrates 
contradictions in U.S. domestic military operations. During the 1992 Los Angeles Riots, 
both federal and National Guard components used deadly force to confront violent mob 
activities with little repercussion. Armed federal and state forces were welcomed during 
Hurricane Katrina. But the original aggressive “RAID” title for the CSTs and the 2008 
comments by the CCMRF commander raised civil liberties concerns. The prospects and 
discussion of DoD organizations conducting riot control-type activities evoke negative 
civil liberties issues. Despite some negative publicity, in responses such as the anthrax 
attacks, Katrina, and the New Horizon Oil Spill, the CBIRF, CST, and CERFP 
organizations have become popular while demonstrating effectiveness in both CBRNE 
and all-hazards responses.   
The CST model indicates that with the integration of advanced civilian training, 
advanced technologies, and with a ICS based structure the HRF might enjoy greater 
utility and interoperability with civilian response organizations. The use of CERFPs and 
CSTs at the New Horizon Oil Spill, the 2003 space shuttle response, and other non-
CBRNE disasters might indicate that the HRF should look to broad all-hazards missions 
with the capability to share classified information across large areas in addition to a 
CBRNE role. Pursuing a dedicated domestic CBRNE and all-hazards response 
organization, versus a dual-missioned organization, could help the HRF avoid some of 
the civilian and TRADOC concerns raised by forces trying to combine the conflicting 
laws and practices of overseas combat and domestic missions. The CST’s advanced 
analytical laboratory and CBRNE detection and communications equipment have ensured 
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great utility beyond the CST’s original mission. Internally, the CSTWG helped National 
Guard Bureau refine the training and employment of these resources.  When an HRF has 
to control multiple CSTs and CERFPs during a significant regional disaster, the 
coordination of laboratory, CBRNE survey results, and communications capabilities on a 
larger scale will be essential to providing region-wide incident awareness and 
assessment, and a COP to the HRF’s parent and subordinate units.   
Based on the initial criticisms and the eventual successes of the CST’s often 
experimental technologies, the HRF should seek advanced systems that will provide the 
best “network-centric” response possible to link communications, CBRNE detection 
capabilities, and existing DoD and civilian communications assets during a regional level 
response. The need to provide classified communications and “network centric” 
capabilities will push the HRF closer to intelligence related roles that present civil liberty 
concerns. Based on previous experience by a DoD domestic CBRNE element the HRF 
should avoid expressed training and planning for nonlethal crowd control operations.  
 
 32
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 33
III. CIVILIAN AND MILITARY LAWS AND PRACTICES FOR 
THE HRF 
This chapter highlights a potential gap in the development of the HRF and the 
associated DoD CBRN enterprise with existing domestic CBRNE and hazardous 
materials response practices and laws.  It also recommends that civilian CBRNE and 
response standards, such as the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution 
Contingency Plan (NCP), the National Response Framework (NRF), and the National 
Incident Management System (NIMS), should take precedence over military operational 
doctrine and contingency plans (CONPLAN) for the employment the HRF.  Civilian 
standards can provide a foundation for HRF’s successful implementation, enhanced 
interoperability, and avoids future legal and operational setbacks.  Criticisms of previous 
DoD CBRNE responses in government audits and private reports include: wasted tax 
dollars, poor training strategies, and poor links to the plans of civilian agencies.  
Adaptation of civilian standards, intelligence oversight, and military “incident awareness 
and assessment” (IAA) practices during implementation could help the HRF avoid past 
criticisms while filling a regional CBRNE response mission.  
Sound integration with existing statutory response organizations and guidelines 
can help the HRF operate safely and effectively with other response organizations.  All of 
DoD’s past domestic CBRNE organizations have faced intense scrutiny or setbacks.  The 
hybrid “civil-military” nature of these organizations presents some of these problems.  
They must meet two sets of standards: DoD standards and civilian emergency response 
requirements.  Military organizations conducting overseas or “homeland defense” 
missions follow DoD doctrine and mainly operate outside of U.S. tort law and federal 
regulations.  Conducting CBRNE and disaster response domestically in “homeland 
security” missions, the HRF must follow both DoD and civilian emergency response 
requirements.  
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A. PPD-8 AND PLANNING GUIDELINES 
The Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-8, entitled National Preparedness, was 
signed by President Obama on March 30, 2011.  PPD-8 provides the outlines of an “all-of 
Nation” preparedness approach including a national preparedness goal, a national 
preparedness system, and planning and definitions of terms used with the PPD itself. 
More definitive guidance from the PPD-8 that HRF leaders can use for planning and 
preparedness guidance is supposed to be published in September 2011.  PPD-8 
supersedes the 2003 HSPD-8; National Preparedness that established priorities for 
national planning.  The NRF has 15 national planning scenarios that depict a credible 
range of terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and related impacts that the HRF can use as a 
baseline for planning until further PPD-8 products are published.  Eleven of the 15 
national planning scenarios refer to CBRNE attacks. Based on common characteristics 
the national planning scenarios are grouped into eight “key scenario sets” to further 
facilitate integrated response planning.  The NRF’s key scenario sets are supported by 
seven incident annexes, including two CBRNE specific annexes, the biological incident, 
and the nuclear/radiological incident annexes.  The nation’s response to a chemical 
weapons event is covered by the Emergency Support Function #10 Annex, Oil and 
Hazardous Materials Response, since chemical agents fall under hazardous materials 
response.  It is import to note that to date NORTHCOM has followed the CBRNE 
scenarios in developing contingency plans (CONPLANS) but was criticized in a 2009 
GAO audit of the CCMRF for poor integration with the plans of civilian response 
organizations (GAO, 2009). The national planning scenarios and incidents annexes 
provide a baseline for HRF planning and potential training scenarios until the PPD-8 is 
fully implemented.  Additionally, plans that address different hazards exist in most 
FEMA regions and in the Regional Contingency Plans (RCPs) and Area Contingency 
Plans (ACPs) developed under NCP guidelines. The HRFs can employ these existing 
region-specific plans such as FEMA Region VII’s New Madrid Seismic Zone Response 
Plan.  
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B. DOMESTIC HAZMAT AND CBRNE RESPONSE LAWS 
The foundations of the nation’s hazardous materials or CBRNE response 
planning, equipment, training, and funding derive from environmental laws. These laws 
include the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation & Liability Act 
(CERCLA) (33 USC 103), the Superfund Amendment & Reauthorization Act (SARA) 
(42 USC), the NCP, and the Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response 29 
Code of Federal Regulations (CRF) 1910.120.  These statutory standards help protect 
citizens, industry, and communities across the United States from hazardous materials on 
a daily basis.  These laws define response authorities for public and private agencies; 
define hazardous substances, emergency planning, and “community right to know.” 
Additionally, they define response clean-up requirements and provide a billion dollar 
fund for public and private agencies to respond and recover from all hazardous materials 
incidents.  The 29 CFR 1910.120 (Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency 
Response) defines legally required protective measures and training for responders within 
the United States dealing with HAZMAT or CBRNE.  First responders, local emergency 
planning committees, federal agencies, and state emergency response commissions 
operate in accordance with these laws, contingency plans, and funding for disasters and 
CBRNE events.  
First implemented in 1968, NCP outlines command structures for CBRNE and oil 
and hazardous materials incident disasters.  The NCP authorizes the Coast Guard and 
EPA manage the National Response System (NRS), the National Response Center 
(NRC), the multi-agency National Response Team (NRT), and 13 multiagency Regional 
Response Teams (RRTs) distributed across the U.S. and its territories.  The RRT provide 
oversight for the development of RCP and ACP.  Run by the Coast Guard, the NRC 
handles over 30,000 CBRNE and hazardous material “incident notifications” each year. 
(National Response Team presentation, 2011)  Under the NCP, the EPA, and Coast 
Guard appoint federal on-scene coordinators (OSCs) who possess specific training and 
legal authority to control all aspects of a domestic CBRNE response.    
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Figure 10.   The National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP) 
(From EPA, 2011)  
Adopted by the Department of Homeland Security, the National Fire Protection 
Association (NFPA) 472 Standard for Competence of Responders to Hazardous 
Materials/Weapons of Mass Destruction Incidents describes the competencies and 
standards for personnel conducting domestic HAZMAT/CBRNE responses (2008).  
During domestic CBRNE response operations, these laws subordinate military doctrine 
and military authority while defining command structures under the NRF, NIMS, and the 
NCP.  Understanding these domestic CBRNE and all-hazards response fundamentals will 
help leaders build and employ a better HRF.  Table 1 outlines some recommended laws, 
guidelines, and HSPDs for the HRF.  These standards provide a template for meeting 
future HRF mission demands and reduce redundant organizations and guidelines that 





Table 1.   HRF Recommended Civilian Response Standards  
Civilian Standards What Why Who Used by:       
HSPD-5 NRF/NIMS 
National Response 





used for domestic 
response operations. 
Legal requirement. Supports 
HRF interoperability. 









preparedness goal,  
Supports preparedness, 
planning,  
Local, state, and 
federal response 
agencies.  
40 CFR Part 300 
Protection of the 
Environment and National 
Oil and Hazardous 
Substances Pollution 




HAZMAT is and 
what agencies have 
statutory response 
authorities.  
Legal requirement. Defines 
DOE, EPA, USCG, DoD, 




Local, state, and 
federal response 
agencies.    
29 CFR 1910.120, 
Hazardous Waste 
Operations and 




substantial threats of 
HAZMAT. 
Legal requirement. Defines 
HAZMAT protective 
measures & standards. 
Supports HRF 
interoperability. 
Local, state, and 
federal response 
agencies. 
49 CFR 180-185 
Hazardous Materials 
Regulations (HMR) are 











Legal requirement. Provides 
HRF personnel critical 
HAZMAT safety, packaging 
and transportation 
information. Supports HRF 
interoperability.  
Local, state, and 
federal response 
agencies. 
NFPA 472 (National Fire 
Protection Academy) 
Basic standards of 
responder competence for 
HAZMAT & CBRNE. 
Performance 




Best practices guidelines. 
Provides protective 
measures and steps for 
effective/safe HAZMAT 
response. Supports HRF 
interoperability. 
Local, state, and 
federal response 
agencies. 
NIOSH (National Institute 
for Occupational Health 
and Safety) – HAZMAT 
personal protective 
equipment (PPE) and 
exposure guidelines. 
PPE specifications 
based on HAZMAT 
and exposures. 
Provides response PPE and 
equipment safety standards. 
Supports HRF 
interoperability. 
Local, state, and 
federal response 
agencies. 







used for HAZMAT. 
Laboratory standards and 
methodologies for handling 
of HAZMAT. Supports 
HRF interoperability and 
collaboration with LRN.  
Used by CDC’s 
Laboratory Response 
Network (LRN), local, 
state, federal and 
private labs. 
 
In an August 2010, HRF conference in Kansas City, Missouri, NORTHCOM and 
NGB leaders met to discuss the development of the HRF and DoD’s CBRN enterprise.  
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The conference discussed at length potential DoD command and control scenarios for a 
domestic CBRNE incident and contingency plans or “CONPLANS” for the HRF and 
DoD’s CBRN enterprise.  The conference also discussed the HRF’s missions in terms of 
military doctrine, the joint planning and execution system (JOPES) and NORTHCOM’s 
CBRNE contingency plan known as the CONPLAN 3500. None of the conference 
materials mentioned the HRF operating under the NCP or under NRF-stipulated 
Emergency Support Function (ESF)-10 (oil and hazardous materials) response guidelines.  
The conference product (Figure 11) reflects a DoD-centric command and control and 
depicts the HRF and military forces almost as battlefield “terrain owners” rather than 
supporting agencies operating within a domestic response environment.   
 
Figure 11.   National Guard Bureau and NORTHCOM Conference Products (From National 
Guard Bureau, 2010) 
While the products describe DoD operational constructs and command relations, 
they omit the NIMS operational level and ICS tactical level command structures, as well 
as the separate emergency support functions that the HRF might support during a 
response.  Local, state, and federal agencies routinely pool resources under a unified 
command or under a specific ESF command.  The HRF’s subordinate elements could be 
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assigned under a unified command or an ESF command to better integrate resources with 
local, state, and federal agencies. The HRFs SAR, medical, and security elements could 
be assigned under an ESF-9 (urban search and rescue), ESF-8 (public health and medical 
services), and ESF 13 (public safety and security) commands respectively. Many of 
elements of the 22 CST’s that deployed to Hurricane Katrina worked under a unified 
EPA and Coast Guard ESF-10 command.  
The products in Figure 11 depict a potential short-coming and “gap” faced by the 
HRF and the CBRN enterprise: the CONPLAN 3500 does not represent any legal 
authorities. In a September 2010, Naval Postgraduate School presentation, Colonel John 
Gereski, a NORTHCOM Staff Judge Advocate officer plainly stated, “A military plan 
does not constitute legal authority” (Gereski, 2010). Employing the HRF under military 
command and control system within a domestic response that is separate from the 
statutorily based NCP, NIMS, and ICS systems potentially threatens a divergent 
command structure and violates the NRF principle of unity of effort. The NCP is the 
nation’s CBRNE response plan and HRF leaders should integrate the HRF into existing 
NCP based RCP and ACP plans and response practices. The NCP and its interagency-
intergovernmental sub-organizations have a track record of success in response to large 
incidents such as the Exxon Valdez and the Deepwater Horizon oil spills as well as 
thousands of smaller CBRNE and hazardous materials incidents.   
C. INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT AND INCIDENT AWARENESS AND 
ASSESSMENT 
The Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980 stems from the 1975 post-Watergate 
United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect 
to Intelligence Activities, also known as the “Church Committee” hearings, chaired by 
Senator Frank Church (Democrat, Idaho). Wrongful use of Army, FBI, and CIA 
intelligence resources resulted in a series of laws and congressional oversight to end 
politically motivated use or improper employment of intelligence agencies.  The laws 
require that all FBI, CIA, and DoD intelligence, counter-intelligence, and intelligence 
actives are conducted in accordance with all U.S. laws and presidential executive orders 
to prevent the abuse of civil liberties by intelligence agencies within the U.S. The 
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Intelligence Community Legal Reference Book (Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence, 2007) and DoD intelligence manuals provide guidelines and information on 
the suite of laws and guidelines from the National Security Act of 1947 to the U.S.A. 
PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005. Knowledge of these laws and 
legal awareness will help ensure the HRF operates effectively and legally within the U.S.   
A decade of rapid technological and intelligence advancements now compound 
intelligence oversight issues for most military units. Intelligence capabilities are now 
embedded in virtually every military element. Advanced encrypted communications, 
information technology systems, sensor systems, robots, and unmanned aerial systems 
(UAS) are common in many units. All of these systems are critical to the “network 
centric” warfighting capability employed in Iraq and Afghanistan.  These same systems 
can be easily construed as intelligence collection assets when operating within the U.S.  
For example, domestic UAS employment by the DoD on the U.S.-Mexican Border and 
elsewhere has been a topic of recent debate. Governors may allow different degrees of 
operational latitude for the National Guard’s UAS systems and intelligence units than the 
Secretary of Defense might allow federal military forces. Different state and federal level 
approaches to intelligence oversight could potentially complicate the HRF’s employment 
of the communications and new information sharing systems that provide units a 
“common operating picture” (COP).   
Presently, Incident Awareness and Assessment (IAA) defines the terms and 
proper use practices for the domestic employment of DoD intelligence assets within the 
U.S. domestic environment. As earlier noted, the U.S. Army’s TC 2-91 Intelligence 
Handbook for Civil Support Operations (Headquarters, Department of the Army 2009), 
the FM-28 Civil Support Operations (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2010), and 
the First Air Force Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) Air Support Handbook 
(First Air Force, 2011) all provide information regarding IAA guidelines for air and 
ground forces. Increasingly civilian law enforcement and emergency management 
agencies are using cellular phone triangulation and Geospatial Information Systems 
(GIS)-linked social media information to direct criminal and emergency response 
information.  Direct employment of these civilian practices by the HRF could result in 
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intelligence oversight and civil liberties violations damaging to the HRF and DoD in 
general. Continuous legal counsel, adherence to intelligence oversight laws, and 
knowledge of IAA practices can safeguard the HRF from legal and civil liberty pitfalls 
that have created setbacks for other DoD organizations. 
D. THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT AND THE INSURRECTION ACT 
U.S. domestic laws, different levels of government, and types of U.S. military 
components add to the conflicts of domestic military employment that previous CBRNE 
units have faced.  U.S. military forces typically fall under into active, reserve, and 
National Guard components or categories.  Active duty and reserve forces typically fall 
under U.S. Code (USC) Title 10 (T-10) as federal forces while the National Guard’s 
Army National Guard and Air National Guard comprise USC Title 32 (T-32) as state-
level forces.  The federal forces answer to the President and Secretary of Defense when 
deployed for domestic operations.  National Guard or state forces follow DoD protocols 
but are subordinated to the governor until activated by the President, typically for 
overseas deployments.  Although uniforms and equipment might be alike, the legal status 
of federal forces and state forces are drastically different due to U.S laws.  In a domestic 
role all federal forces answer to the President and follow strict mission assignments 
issued by the Secretary of Defense. Federal forces are usually restricted from law 
enforcement roles under the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 as stated in United States Code 
(USC): 
Use of Army and Air Force as Posse Comitatus, Whoever, except in cases 
and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act 
of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a 
posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this 
title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. (18 USC, § 1385, 
1878) 
When operating at a state level, National Guard elements do not fall under Posse 
Comitatus and can conduct law enforcement and a wide range of tasks when ordered by a 
governor.  Inter-state Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) agreements 
can also specify law enforcement authority for National Guard personnel responding to 
disasters in other states.  Since all disasters have local or state-level impacts, the National 
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Guard forces are often “forward deployed” and already operating when incidents occur.  
With fewer proscriptions such as the Posse Comitatus Act, and with state-level response 
roles extending to the colonial era, Guard forces often have greater utility as well as 
proximity to the majority of America’s disasters.  
Since its founding, the U.S. has historically regarded domestic military 
employment cautiously and employed the Posse Comitatus Act widely since its inception 
in 1878.  The few exceptions include the large deployment of federal troops to the South 
during reconstruction and a federal military response to the 1992 Los Angeles riots under 
the Insurrection Act of 1807.  The Insurrection Act has been a vehicle to enforce U.S. law 
during the civil rights era and to also restore order during large disturbances.  Regardless 
of CBRNE or all-hazards type missions, the Posse Comitatus Act, strict Secretary of 
Defense oversight of federal forces and the strict mission assignments of federal forces 
define the great differences and day-to-day operational constraints existing between 
America’s state and federal-level CBRNE forces.  
The Insurrection Act and the opposing Posse Comitatus Act represent the tension 
and periodic conflicts that can arise regarding military operations within the U.S.  Few 
legal examples better reflect the complexity and contradictions in American democracy 
and how they that might impact domestic military operations.  In a successful effort to 
repeal changes that had increased presidential Insurrection Act authorities in the 2007 
John Warner National Defense Authorization Act, Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont 
referred to these laws as a “useful friction” in determining appropriate domestic response 
measures while limiting the powers of government (Tahlequah Daily Press, 2007).  In 
light of potential contradictions, HRF leaders and National Guard leaders must be 
knowledgeable in both the Posse Comitatus Act and Insurrection Act to better serve 
elected officials and avoid civil liberty concerns while protecting the American public.   
With proper integration of civilian response laws and standards the HRF can 
improve the nation’s regional CBRNE response capabilities. The HRF’s “civil-military” 
hybrid mission presents unique legal and operational challenges.  While most military 
units employ “doctrine” for overseas missions and operate outside of tort law and federal 
regulations the HRF must follow both DoD and civilian emergency response standards in 
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its domestic role.  Selection and adherence to proper DoD guidance and civilian laws can 
help the HRF meet future audits and serve as “best practices” guidelines for response 
operations. In all response operations, HRF leaders must take care to adhere to Posse 
Comitatus, intelligence oversight requirements, DoD IAA practices, and future guidelines 
provided by PPD-8.  For CBRNE response the NFPA 472 and 29 CFR 1910.120 
provided legal guidelines and practices. For CBRNE response operations, fully 
integrating the HRF under the direction of an EPA or Coast Guard appointed OSC and 
within an ESF-10 based response is essential for employing the HRF’s resources 
effectively and within the legal guidelines and routine practices established by the NCP.    
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IV. CASE STUDY: THE ISRAELI HOME FRONT COMMAND  
The 1990 Persian Gulf War shifted Israel’s traditional battle fronts from its 
borders to city centers. In response, Israel reformed into civil defense capabilities creating 
within the Israeli Defense Force (IDF), a new organization called the Home Front 
Command (HFC).  The HFC and the U.S. National Guard’s response capabilities have 
developed from different laws, circumstances, and nations but have developed many of 
the same capabilities in the defense of their homelands.  
Israel’s HFC provides the basis for a case study for a number of reasons. The 
HFC and National Guard both support democratically elected governments and both use 
a blend of full-time and part-time forces dedicated to domestic response operations. Also, 
many exchange visits between senior National Guard officers and the HFC have 
occurred. Routinely challenged by suicide bombings and rocket barrages from its 
borders, the HFC is essentially operating in “wartime” conditions and exerts greater 
authority across Israel than its National Guard counter-part. The HFC is empowered to 
coordinate training and response across industries, ministries, hospitals, and 
communities.  Due to laws restricting domestic military employment and no persistent 
terrorist threat on U.S. borders, the National Guard has more proscribed authorities.  
With search and rescue, CBRNE, decontamination, and medical support the 
National Guard’s 10 new HRFs will have domestic response capabilities that mirror some 
of the HFC’s regional or district level organizations. National Guard leaders should look 
at the HFC example to build the best possible capabilities into the new HRF.  A sharing 
of techniques and procedures between organizations will benefit both. Also, the HFC 
already has established training programs and military schools that the National Guard 
can emulate for its own forces.  Israel’s use of the HFC forces for humanitarian rescue 
mission following earthquakes in Haiti, Turkey, Greece, and other disasters have served 
to increase organization proficiency. In a method of transparent government and manner, 
similar to U.S. Government Accountability Office reports critical of the National Guard’s 
CBRNE elements, Israel’s Winograd report (Winograd, 2008) harshly appraised the 
performance of the IDF and HFC during the 2006 Second Lebanon War. In addition, a 
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Guard focus on Israeli rapid response measures and experience gained by the HFC during 
the Second Lebanon War could identify “best practices” for the Guard as a whole that are 
applicable both to terrorist incidents and natural disasters.  Further exchanges of 
information and training partnerships can help the forces of both countries disseminate 
information, potentially save dollars, and, more importantly, save lives.  
Comparing the domestic operations of U.S. military forces to those of a different 
nation provides some challenges. No other country has a state and federal system of 
government, the land-mass, and population as seen in the U.S., thus making a direct civil-
military comparisons difficult.  Few countries have a U.S. style “grass-roots” political 
system in which a provincial or state governor can tell a national-level leader “no” to 
prospective national level assistance or potentially act to impede a large disaster 
response.  Still, best practices from different types of government might serve as 
examples for the National Guard’s HRF to adapt.  Furthermore, domestic legal systems, 
demographics, and civilian components of government also influence how a nation 
employs its military.   
The Superfund Amendment Reauthorization Act and the Stafford Act are two 
laws of great significance to U.S. response operations.  These laws give the civilian U.S. 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) statutory overall response authority to include controlling U.S. military 
forces during a CBRNE or disaster response. Consequently, U.S. forces, unlike some 
foreign military counterparts, must configure themselves to meet many legally stipulated 
civilian response standards inside the U.S.   
The U.S. is also unique in that since the conclusion of skirmishes in Mexico in 
1917, the U.S. military has structured itself almost exclusively to operate overseas 
whereas Israeli and European armies are configured to fight on their own soil.  The U.S. 
was born of a revolution, partially driven against standing military formations within its 
borders.  These somewhat unique aspects of American culture and history create political 
inertia against federal level active-duty military forces operating outside the purview of a 
governor’s or state-level control.  
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A. ISRAELI HISTORY AND EXPERIENCE 
Israel’s present HFC configuration was created in 1992, following Scud missile 
attacks during the 1991 Persian Gulf War (Israel Defense Force, n.d. a).  Striking in 
Israel’s city centers against large civilian populaces, the Scuds challenged conventional 
disaster response and required greater cohesion in employing resources during response 
operations.  The Scud missiles required a combined civilian and military response due to 
extensive damage and to the missiles’ chemical weapon capable warhead.  The IDF 
successfully implemented distribution of individual CBRNE protective equipment, media 
engagement, medical response support, and rescue efforts during these attacks (Israeli 
Defense Force, n.d. a).  Post-Gulf War analysis indicated that an organization with 
greater authority and autonomy from Israel’s existing military regional commands was 
needed to protect Israel’s populated areas. 
The HFC traces its origins to 1948 when the HAGA—the Hebrew acronym for 
civil defense—was created (Israel Defense Force n.d. b). The HAGA was a response to 
the 1948 Egyptian aerial bombing of Tel Aviv, which, like the Scuds 42 years later, 
caused damage to the civilian populace and buildings.  In 1951, the Knesset further 
codified the HAGA’s legal status with a law stating “to take all the necessary steps to 
protect the populace in the event of any attack by hostile forces or to minimize the results 
of such an attack, the emphasis being on saving lives” (Israeli Defense Force, n.d. b).  
The bombardment of Jerusalem during the 1967 Six Day War and the 1973 Yom Kippur 
War demonstrated that greater government preparation was needed to support and engage 
the Israeli populace during a national crisis.  With front-line military demands placed on 
reserve units, Israel realized that a blend of individual civilian preparation combined with 
police and security force capabilities were needed to rapidly provide rescue and limit 
damage in rear areas.  Still, the Yom Kippur War and Six Day War did not bring to bear 
the impacts across the greater population seen later with the Scud missiles in 1991.  
Israeli’s settlements form another element of the HFC that initially fell under a 
separate command called HAG’MAR, which is the Hebrew term for Regional Defense.  
Prior to the establishment of an Israeli state, Jewish settlements had organic security 
forces for protection during periods of upheaval in Palestine.  During the 1948 War of 
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Independence, the settlements served as a defensive component and were sometimes 
besieged.  In the wake of the Yom Kippur War, the settlements were further fortified 
especially in areas of potential fighting.  The HAG’MAR safeguarded settlements 
through patrol activities, physical security, lighting, and other security measures.  In 
1997, the HAG’MAR was combined with the HAGA division under the HFC to further 
consolidate rear area operations under the Chief Command Officer for the HAGA and 
HAG’MAR.  
B. CREATION OF THE HOME FRONT COMMAND  
The 1992 creation of the HFC was a significant transformation of Israeli defense 
activities and boundaries that reflected evolving threats against Israel’s populace.  Prior 
to the HFC establishment, Israel was divided into three regional commands known as the 
Southern, Central and Northern commands (Israeli Defense Force, n.d. b).  The IDF’s 
battlefield or “maneuver” general officers in charge of each of these three commands had 
to contend with frontline combat operations on Israel’s borders as well as efforts to 
secure civilian populations and rear areas.  With the three original commands retaining 
some control over key routes into their areas of operation, the HFC was established as a 
fourth IDF command under Brigadier General Ze’ev Livneh (Israeli Defense Force, n.d. 
b).  It was viewed that development of the HFC relieved the maneuver commanders of 
rear area and civil operations so they could better focus on military threats in the 
northern, central, and southern regions.  The HFC itself is divided into five regions or 
districts that stretch from Acre in the north to Ashkelon in the south and an eastern line 
from Judea to Samaria covering the bulk of Israel’s populated areas.  The HFC districts 
as depicted in Figure 12 are: the Northern District, Dan District, Jerusalem District, 
Central District, and the Southern District.  
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Figure 12.   HFC Districts (From Israeli Defense Forces, n.d. b)  
Legally, the HFC has significant powers to organize, train, and prepare Israel to 
manage the consequences of terrorist attacks, warfare, and natural disasters.  These 
powers stem from paragraph two of the 5711–1951 Civil Defense Law or “the Haga 
Law” and Civil Defense Regulations 5733–1973 (Israeli Defense Forces, n.d. b).  These 
laws stipulate in detail the HFC’s authority:  
5711-1951 Civil Defense Law Paragraph 2.f: To train and direct aid 
organizations to fulfill their functions in the field of civil defense. 2.i: To 
train the public in matters of civil defense.  2. j: … To undertake any other 
action necessary to fulfill its function pursuant to the Civil Defense 
statutes. 
5733-1973 Civil Defense Regulations (Factories, Institutions Equipment 
and Training their employees) determines the power to prepare those in 
charge and to train employees at the factory. (Israeli Defense Forces, n.d. 
b) 
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From this legal basis, the HFC is able to direct many functions to prepare and 
protect the populace with a “whole of nation” approach. The HFC conducts training in 
schools, factories, government ministries, national exercises, alert systems, distribution of 
protective equipment, and search and rescue capabilities.  Based on actual earthquake, car 
bomb, and missile response operations, the HFC has developed both regular and reserve 
units that conduct medical, CBRNE, and recently added search and rescue capabilities.  
The structural diagram Figure 13 describes some of the HFC organizational and 
operational regional structures. 
 
Figure 13.   HFC Organizational and Operational Regional Structures (From IDF, n.d. b) 
The year 2006 was a crucible year for the HFC. A conflict-driven disaster with 
parallels to America’s Hurricane Katrina event occurred within Israel as part of the 
Second Lebanon War.  Possessing unprecedented missile and artillery capabilities 
supplemented by foreign nations, Hezbollah and Hamas unleashed approximately 4000 
missiles carrying tons of explosives and shrapnel upon Israel’s populated areas (Raday, 
2006).  Striking predominately in Israel’s north, an estimated 330,000 Israelis were 
displaced, 43 civilians killed, and 4262 wounded (Raday, 2006).  Over 6000 homes were 
destroyed, critical infrastructure was damaged, and Haifa, Israel’s third largest city, 
suffered hundreds of missile strikes in a 34-day period (Greenhill, 2007).  Although 
confined to northern Israel and in proximity to the Gaza Strip, the conflict brought 
tremendous social and economic dislocation to much of Israel’s population.  Many of 
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Israel’s businesses, schools, railroads, hospitals, crops, and livestock were destroyed or 
damaged by the barrages.  Hundreds of thousands were forced into crowded government 
shelters, military bases, and temporary tent camps.  Others moved in with relatives or to 
hotels outside of missile range.  
Mainly related to the conduct of military operations inside Lebanon, the 
Winograd Commission was an Israeli national level inquiry into the conduct of the 
Second Lebanon War.  The commission was critical of the Olmert government’s 
handling of the war, senior-level decision making, and IDF battlefield shortcomings.  The 
HFC’s performance was less criticized.  Despite the vast scale of dislocation and damage 
caused by attacks, faults were found in alert systems and quality of the shelters available 
to the public.  Alerts were too broad based and sent too many people into shelters for too 
long.  In some cases, alerts failed and the public was not notified of incoming missiles 
before they struck.  Shelters often lacked proper facilities such as air conditioning and 
sufficient toilets, and many shelters were unsanitary (Raday, 2006).  Like American GAO 
audits, the Winograd Commission demonstrates another important parallel between the 
U.S. HRF and Israel’s HFC—accountability to the citizens and democracy that each 
organization represents. 
Challenged by the events of the Second Lebanon War, the HFC set about 
addressing shortcomings identified in the Winograd Commission report.  The HFC has 
placed great effort into annual nationwide exercises.  The latest of these exercises, called 
Turning Point Four, occurred in May 2010 (Leyden, 2010).  The five-day drill focused on 
distribution of CBRNE protection kits, search and rescue operations, movement to 
shelters, use of underground parking areas for services, use of safe areas, hospital 
operations, and testing Israel’s alert systems.   
Central to improving alerts for the civilian population is the “Color Red” 
notification system.  Originally developed as a sniper detection system for use near Gaza 
area, the Color Red system is linked to radar systems to rapidly determine a missile 
launch and probable impact area (Opall-Rome, 2009).  Since 2006, Color Red coverage 
has expanded throughout the country.  Also the predicted missile impact area has been  
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greatly reduced to limit portions of the population affected by an alert. Of greater 
importance, Israel is linking the alerts for missile and other threats to cell phones and 
other media.  
Now Israel is launching a national cell phone alert system to target 
emergency information about impending natural or manmade disasters to 
affected residents. The system alerts residents even if cell phones are in 
silent mode, taking over the cell phone system to prevent the kind of 
service outages experienced in the aftermath of events like Hurricane 
Katrina or the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. (Greenhill, 2010)  
With Color Red and more alert sirens providing greater warning to missiles in a 
more discrete radius, the HFC has demonstrated increased ability to protect the populace 
against increasing enemy missile capabilities.  Missile strikes on Ashkelon, Sderot, and 
other cities presently continue to test the HFC’s capabilities and the Israeli population.   
C. COMPARISONS: THE HOME FRONT COMMAND AND U.S. 
NATIONAL GUARD  
In summary, the HFC is a militarized civil defense command on a war-time 
footing with unprecedented response powers and unity of command over Israel’s 
population, private sector, and government with a democratic state.  While this is 
potentially a negative comment, it does reflect a reality that Israel has suffered increased 
military attacks on its civil population over the past 20 years.  Experience from the 
Persian Gulf War, Second Lebanon War, the Winograd Commission, and sustained 
barrages have added to the HFC’s experience.  Additional humanitarian rescue and 
medical operations in Haiti, Turkey, Kenya, Greece, and Pakistan have also contributed 
to the HFC’s professionalism.   
Legally, the HFC is very different from its U.S. National Guard counterpart.  The 
HFC’s power and organization is derived from civil defense related imperatives.  With 
limited domestic military threats, National Guard forces have a largely disaster-related 
role in support of state and federal civilian organizations with statutory authority over 




different countries they support.  Despite different legal authorities, threats, and 
geography, both organizations and nations can import and export lessons that benefit 
their populations.  
The experience of the HFC provides many lessons learned that the National 
Guard and the 10 new regional HRFs can employ.  The fact that National Guard 
commanders, Lieutenant General (LTG) Stephen Blum and General (GEN) Craig 
McKinley, have made well publicized trips to Israel reflects the similar mission that the 
HFC shares with the National Guard elements. The HFC mobilization process, search and 
rescue, and alerts are areas of potential focus for Guard leaders.  
Like the regional HRFs, elements of the HFC bring regional CBRNE, search and 
rescue, decontamination, emergency triage, and medical treatment to authorities during a 
disaster or terrorist event.  At a national level, the HFC has greater control to train and 
manage the response operations of ministries, and populated areas.  Many of the HFC’s 
comparable national functions belong to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s 
civilian agencies like FEMA and state-level agencies that follow the U.S. National 
Response Framework (NRF) (DHS, 2010).  However, during extreme situations, the 
Insurrection Act or National Emergency Powers allow the U.S. President to place the 
Guard or other federal military elements in charge of response and civil defense 
operations.  A governor can also place the National Guard in charge of state level and 
local response operations. In such situations, the powers of the Guard and or federal 
military forces would temporarily parallel some of the HFC’s scope of authority.  
The HFC’s mobilization of reserve forces, marshaling of equipment, and alert 
systems are practices the Guard seeks to emulate for the CST, CERFPs, and the new 
HRF.  At the CST Commanders Conference on August 22, 2006, LTG Blum declared his 
war on the Guard’s “antiquated phone roster and armory based alert system that slow the 
Guard’s response” (Blum 2006).  Blum advocated the Israeli use of multimedia, pagers, 
and text messages to let soldiers know where to report and to rapidly move equipment at 
staging areas for emergencies.  LTG Blum stated repeatedly that the “phone roster” and 
soldiers reporting to armories instead of locations close to an incident will continue to 
delay the Guard’s response and cost lives (Blum, 2006).  
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From the Table 2, it is apparent that the Guard’s suite of capabilities is close to 
the HFC’s developed capabilities.  
Table 2.   HRF and HFC Capabilities 
Capabilities Guard HRF, CST, CERFP HFC  
Regional CBRNE 
Response 
Yes. 57 CSTs,17 CERFPs, 10 
HRF’s decon capabilities.)  EPA and 
USCG lead agencies. 
Yes. 5 Reserve NBC Defense 




Yes. 17 CERFP & 10 HRF with 
Triage, Mass Casualty Support, 
Health and Human Services and 
Hospital lead agencies. 
Yes. Mass Casualty and 
Cooperation with Hospital Staff.  
Search and Rescue 
(SAR) 
Yes. 17 CERFPs, 10 HRFs. Local, 
State, FEMA lead agency. 
Yes.1 Active SAR Btn, 5 Reserve 
SAR Btn, National SAR unit 
Training: Schools, 
Industries, Hospital 
Staff, Special Needs 
Community, 
Ministries 
No. Participates in National Level 
Exercises Only.  No Specified 
Training Role. Local, State, Federal 
Agencies Lead.  
Yes. National Level Exercises, 




No U.S. equivalent Population & NBC Department 
Evacuation and 
Shelter Authority 
No. State and Federal Authority 
Only. Guard can support. 
Yes. Protection Department 
Missile Response and 
Alert Systems 
 
No. No U.S. equivalent  
 
Yes. Color Red and other 
functions. 
 
The two organizations have great similarities; yet, legally and authoritatively, they 
are very different.  The HFC’s ability to train and work with many parts of Israeli society 
and government helps to provide a great depth of training and response knowledge prior 
to an incident.  In a mainly supporting role to civilian response agencies, the National 
Guard is confined to a more reactive role that its HFC counterpart despite the Guard’s 
high training levels.  
The nature of Israel’s threats requires such capabilities from the HFC, whereas the 
lower threat and greater restrictions placed on military response by U.S. laws reduce the 
Guard’s leading domestic roles.  The HFC’s consolidated response authority and 
capabilities probably exceed the U.S. civil defense efforts of World War II.  Still, the 
National Guard’s CBRNE units participate in hundreds of responses, training events, and 
National Special Security Events (NSSE) like the 2009 inauguration.  In addition to a 
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domestic mission, the National Guard, like its IDF reserve counterpart, also contributes 
greatly to the national war fighting capabilities.  Hundreds of thousands of Guard soldiers 
have deployed to Iraq, Afghanistan, Horn of Africa, and Kuwait for combat operations. 
Continued combat deployments seem to indicate that the National Guard will not become 
a constabulary or exclusively a rescue force.   
Still, the U.S. should follow Israel’s use of multimedia to alert and deploy Guard 
forces.  The older sirens and designated shelters linked to the U.S. civil defense efforts of 
the 1950s and 1960s are no longer marked or functional.  Also, threats to the U.S., like 
Israel, have the potential to grow and change in capability and sophistication. The 
upsurge in violence and advanced weaponry of Mexico’s drug cartels indicate such a 
change.  Whether identified by a U.S. GAO audit or the Winograd Commission, 
adaptations and improvements should be made before incidents happen.  The experiences 
of the HFC and previous U.S. CBRNE organizations should be considered as the HRF 
program develops now.  Better alerts, a review of shelter locations and streamlined 
mobilization of forces for domestic incidents will not require a U.S. policy change 
regarding the use of military forces and can save both training time and dollars now. 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS FOR THE HRF 
A. A POTENTIAL HRF RESPONSE SCENARIO 
Warning sirens wail and missiles impact in urban areas as ambulances race and 
hundreds are displaced to shelters. Cued by a missile alert system and new multimedia 
alerts via television, radio and text messages; HRF members report to staging areas near 
the worst impacted areas.  Evacuating holiday shoppers from a collapsed shopping mall 
and an adjoining parking facility is complicated by a vehicle borne improvised explosive 
devices (VBIED) that was remotely detonated beneath an interstate overpass near the 
area with the most casualties. Search and rescue (SAR) personnel begin to move via 
alternate routes as HRF medical personnel arrive via helicopter at the shopping mall with 
advanced life-support system (ALS) capabilities. HRF security personnel move to relieve 
burdened local police and border patrol agents at traffic control points (TCP) and to assist 
the flow of displaced persons out of the worst-hit areas. Working alongside local fire 
departments and the EPA, highly trained CST personnel move to check for any possible 
CBRNE hazards before conducting inspections of gas lines and pressurized industrial 
chemical storage tanks to ensure responder safety near the impact zones. Older structures 
with asbestos and other hazardous building materials containing pulmonary hazards are 
collapsed and burning near one of the incident site locations. Aerosolized silica powder 
dust from crushed glass and alkali dust from concrete add to the pulmonary hazards. This 
will require the HRF to provide decontamination capabilities for fire, utility, police, and 
construction workers involved in the recovery process. A cartel “stay behind team” 
begins sniping at responders near another impact site forcing the HRF to allocate 
additional security personnel to support both rescue efforts and local law enforcement 
battling cartel members. Additional IEDs and VBIEDs detonate or are discovered near 
routes into impacted areas further slowing response efforts. 
Twenty hours after the multiple missile impacts, sniping and IEDs, the weight of 
military and multiagency support to the response begins to tell. Police, public works, 
communications, power generation, transportation, law enforcement, medical facilities, 
refugee camps, and public affairs have been augmented by state, federal, and military 
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personnel as an initially chaotic response begins to mature. Governors demand additional 
federal resources and a Presidential Disaster Declaration while various political factions 
clamor for a cross-border strike. On cue from state emergency management, the HRF 
staff helps transport supplies to newly opened public shelters just outside of current 
missile ranges. National Guard forces and the Army Corps of Engineers provide power to 
the damaged areas for rescue, medical, and fire services; all require supplementary power 
for lighting systems, decontamination equipment, and new shelters without electricity.   
Unmanned aerial systems (UAS) provide the HRF live feed from near the incident 
sites for additional IEDs and missile damage. The multi-spectral imagining and thermal-
capable UAS systems also detect potential fire “hotspots” and hazardous materials 
releases as a result of the attacks. As at “ground zero” in New York City and at Hurricane 
Katrina, the CSTs attached to the HRF provide the backbone of response 
communications with the secure Trojan Spirit linked mobile Secret Internet Protocol 
Router (SIPR) network and civilian response communications. Outside of the state and 
local response, NORTHCOM/NORAD begins to identify potential targets in known 
cartel areas of operations near the impacted areas while the State Department begins 
engagement with appropriate counterparts. In other regions, government agencies begin 
to look for groups specifically linked to the attacks while the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard 
search for submarines that might be moving weapons in addition to drugs.  
After a 48-hour period, additional National Guard HRF personnel supplement the 
border patrol and customs officials at border checkpoints to help the resumption of 
normal cross border commerce while looking for drugs, weapons, and cartel members. 
The CST personnel continue work with fire departments and state and federal level EPAs 
to detect and identify hazards in the impacted areas. To counter explosive hazards DoD 
explosive ordinance (EOD) teams work with police and fire to render safe any 
unexploded missiles and IEDs. HRF medical personnel have provided “surge” medical 
capacity to support local hospitals, emergency medical services (EMS), and to the 
shelters near the impacted areas. Other HRF and attached CERFP personnel continue to 
decontaminate responders and equipment working in the impacted areas. A portion of 
these assets are posted near major hospitals to decontaminate victims and ambulances 
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that might be covered with asbestos dust or other toxic materials. The collapsed shopping 
mall and parking garage sites are managed by local fire and FEMA USAR teams that 
direct HRF personnel searching for bodies and extracting victims. State and federal 
agencies continue to request HRF resources to support rapidly established shelters. 
Occasional rocket fire continues to tax response resources but produce fewer casualties 
and damage than the initial coordinated barrage due to heightened public awareness and 
the new multimedia- linked missile alert system.  
After seven days, private medical facilities begin to rebound as do private and 
public utilities. Contract resources replace many military functions outside of missile 
impact ranges. The EPA handles some of the hazardous materials response under the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation Liability Act (CERCLA) 
response law while Stafford Act funds offset losses to businesses, infrastructure, and 
homes. The demands for CST communications abate but fire departments request 
prolonged CST support to supplement fire fighters recovering from weeklong shifts and 
sustained rescue efforts. HRF security elements remain four more days to secure 
impacted sites and to support other military forces already engaged in long-term border 
deployments. As the response efforts slow and recovery begins, HRF resources are 
released for future events.   
While such attacks have occurred in Israel’s northern cities, this depicted incident 
is occurring simultaneously in El Paso, Texas, and El Centro, California, as cartels 
hypothetically battle for control of drug and human trafficking into the U.S. cross-border 
violence could damage commerce in U.S. communities close to the border between 
Brownsville, Texas and San Diego, California. Grenades, automatic weapons, IEDs, 
evacuated towns, and beheadings are commonplace with cartels battling along the border. 
Manportable Air Defense (MANPAD) systems, land mines, advanced communication 
systems, mortars, unmanned air systems (UAS), frequency-hopping radios, IEDs and 
electronic “warfare” type systems are less prevalent but still found in the hands of cartels. 
While this scenario is remote, the violence in the cartel sanctuaries near the Mexican 
border could potentially require a type of military support similar to the Home Front 
Command’s (HFC) employment in Israel.  
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Although it is uncertain that any HRF might respond to the scenario described 
above, the devastation of recent earthquakes and tsunamis provide clear examples of 
likely natural disaster scenarios that could tax the resources of an HRF well beyond the 
depicted cross-border attack. Conventional military training, doctrine, and equipment 
cannot adequately meet the needs of the potential domestic missions the HRF will face as 
the nation’s first military regional-level CBRNE and all-hazards response capability. 
Based on the experiences and the lessons provided by previous DoD and Israeli CBRNE 
and disaster response units, the public and elected officials will demand significant 
response capabilities and performance in the HRF.      
1. Technologies and IAA 
The border scenario points to the critical need for the HRF to possess advanced 
technologies to support response to complex disasters or terrorist attacks. The same 
controversial forward thinking that provided advanced communications and technology 
spin-offs from the CST program should be applied to the HRF’s future command, 
control, communication, and information systems. Feed from UAS systems, previously 
employed by Guard forces in floods and fires with state level consent, can enhance the 
HRF’s situational awareness capabilities over large areas in a wide variety of response 
operations.  Attention to intelligence oversight, proper integration of incident awareness 
and assessment (IAA) doctrine, and the safeguarding of American civil liberties must be 
integral to the HRF’s employment of new technologies and systems. Intelligence 
oversight will become more critical as more civilian response agencies use individual 
Americans’ cell phones, Twitter, Facebook, and other GIS-linked information to locate 
disaster victims, determine resource allocations, and address public-affairs concerns. 
Within the HRF, an IAA staff section in place of a traditional military S-2 intelligence 
staff can work closely with state, federal, and military legal representatives to ensure the 




intelligence oversight pitfalls. The Army’s FM 3-28, TC 2-91, and the First Air Force 
DSCA Air Support Handbook all provide guidance on how to employ DoD capabilities 
legally in the domestic environment.   
2. Mission Scope and Flexibility 
The potential of terror attacks combined with the realities of recent disasters in 
Haiti and Japan also point to the need for HRFs to train on medical, SAR, and CBRNE 
tasks as “core capabilities” tasks that provide a basis for flexibility in responding to a 
wide range of missions. The original narrow CBRNE mission scope of the CST’s was 
widened by the U.S. Congress in 2007 to allow for this type of response flexibility. The 
addition of a radiological component in Japan’s earthquake further reinforces that many 
natural disasters also include CBRNE-related responses. This was evident in the dual 
purpose capabilities that the CST’s CBRNE, laboratory, and communications capabilities 
brought to the space shuttle disaster and the mitigating of the hazardous materials 
displaced in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. The HRF’s need to work closely with 
civilian response organizations and within civilian response standards is also clear from 
past CBRNE responses and integration with responders for potential significant disasters 
like a New Madrid Seismic Zone event.  
3. Collaboration and Plans 
As a regional force, HRFs are designed and intended to respond across state 
boundaries. This specifies that HRFs must cooperate and coordinate with the state and 
National Guard entities within the boundaries of the 10 Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) regions. Conversely, the HRF’s regional National Guard and state 
agency partners must provide committed “pre-incident” support and cooperation to an 
HRF’s regional planning, training, and exercise efforts. Such regional collaboration and 
sharing of resources is unprecedented but essential to an integrated civil-military 
response required by large disasters. The present regional sharing of Guard forces 
occurring through emergency management assistance compacts (EMAC) must now 
extend “pre-incident” to the new HRF to ensure regional level response success. Such 
collaboration will ensure the HRFs maintain both the “proximity” and utility to response 
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efforts that other National Guard CBRNE elements have demonstrated. External to their 
FEMA regions, the HRFs will have to collaborate with NORTHCOM and federal 
military forces responding to natural disasters or as part of DoD’s CBRN enterprise.  
 
Figure 14.   HRF Collaboration & Response Spectrum  
Familiarity with the plans of state, federal, and DoD agencies such as U.S. 
NORTCHOM’s CONPLAN 3500 are another essential element of HRF collaboration.  In 
addition to state and DoD plans, the National Contingency Plan (NCP), which was 
approved by President Johnson in 1968, already provides a blueprint for the nation’s 
CBRNE and hazardous materials response under the authorities of an appointed Federal 
On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC). The NCP also has a “family of plans” in the Regional 
Contingency Plans (RCPs) and Area Contingency Plans (ACPs) that the HRF’s can 
follow for CBRNE and hazardous materials response. To date the majority of 
NORTHCOM’s contingency plans have been used only in exercises whereas the NCP is 
used daily for local and national level responses. The “gap” between non-statutorily 
based DoD plans and the statutorily based NCP plans reflect only one challenge the HRF 
faces in domestic collaboration, planning, and response.  
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4. Civil Liberties 
Concurrent with technologies, IAA and intelligence oversight concerns, National 
Guard leaders, and legal staff must pay due diligence to an issue as old as the U.S. itself. 
Civil liberty concerns always stand to inflame a broad political spectrum. The initial 
concern over the initial RAID title for the CSTs and the viral nature of comments made 
by the original CCMRF commander regarding “crowd control” reflects the sensitive and 
sometimes contradictory nature of domestic U.S. military employment. The types of 
security the National Guard and federal military forces provided successfully during the 
Los Angeles riots and Hurricane Katrina will be essential to future HRF missions. Still, 
poorly worded statements about of the HRF’s security element training with “non-lethal” 
packages for crowd control could pose the greatest potential public relations and political 
concerns for the HRF.  Knowledge and appropriate employment of the HRF under the 
opposing Posse Comitatus and Insurrection Acts is critical to the HRF’s ability to provide 
timely and relevant security and life-saving support to a domestic incident.  
5. Examples from Israel’s Home Front Command  
Keeping mission flexibility similar to what the Israeli Home Front Command 
(HFC) demonstrates in meeting the demands of terrorism, rocket attacks, and natural 
disasters can enhance the capabilities of the HRF’s ability to provide response capability.  
The use of multi-media technology linked to the Color Red alert system, frequent 
exercises, and military support combined with close civilian cooperation represent HFC 
successes that the HRF can also apply. The HFC’s overseas response efforts in Turkey, 
Pakistan, and Haiti represent another practice that the HRFs should adopt to improve unit 
expertise while providing U.S. humanitarian assistance overseas. Additionally, the HFC’s 
ability to internalize criticisms and implement changes based upon an external document 
like the Winograd report reflects another “best practice” that the HRF can emulate.   
C. CONCLUSIONS  
With 57 full-time CSTs, 17 CERFPs and now 10 HRFs, the National Guard has 
committed over 10,000 soldiers and airmen to domestic missions that require advanced 
domestic training in addition to supporting ongoing unit deployments to Iraq, 
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Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Horn of Africa. This significant commitment of 
resources to both complex domestic and overseas missions must be matched with a 
commitment of substantial funding and training to ensure a force that can actually 
provide credible command and control, security, decontamination, SAR, CBRNE, and 
medical capabilities. Within the domestic response arena, a failure of these “advertised” 
capabilities could lead to reduced funding or a loss of mission. As seen in the CST and 
CERFP programs, Congress has played a decisive role regarding the domestic DoD 
CBRNE response capabilities and may contribute to the HRF’s future. With looming 
DoD funding reductions poor performance by the HRFs is something the National Guard 
can ill afford when supporting future domestic operations.  As the nation’s first two 
HRFs become operational in the Washington and Ohio on October 1, 2011, they serve as 
the test platforms for an evolution in domestic-military employment and the successes of 
the HRF program. 
With an annual budget of $156 million, it is essential to ensure the HRF meets the 
demands of both regional CBRNE response and public scrutiny (National Guard Bureau, 
2010).  Selecting standards, technologies, and practices for an organization, which does 
not yet fully exist and has a new mission, are central problems in creating the 10 new 
HRFs. Past GAO audits, ACLU concerns, and internal DoD “push-back” demonstrate the 
scrutiny the HRF will face. Criticisms of the Israeli HFC in the Winograd report further 
demonstrate the oversight that domestic response organizations encounter.  Still, DoD’s 
previous CBRNE organizations provide sound examples of successes that HRF leaders 
can follow in the creation of these new units. The institutional knowledge of these 
CBRNE organizations now extends back to 1996 and through thousands of successful 
response, support, and training missions that have occurred in every state and region.  
The HRF will coordinate the regional EMAC response of CSTs and CERFPs that 
reside in individual states. The HRF’s unique regional mission will require greater 
collaboration and coordination across more federal and state entities than any previous 
CBRNE organizations. The HRF’s hybrid domestic and overseas requirements also 
present unique challenges. Operating domestically, the HRF must follow both DoD and 
civilian emergency response requirements and adhere to intelligence oversight laws, 
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while most military units simply employ “doctrine” for overseas. Through intra- and 
inter-regional coordination, selection of technologies capable of supporting regional 
command and control, use of IAA practices and appropriate civil-military standards, the 
HRF can capitalize on past CBRNE organizations and provide a credible suite of regional 
CBRNE and disaster response capabilities.      
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